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Abstract 
  
 World War II featured monumental battles, such as the Normandy invasions, the Battle of 
the Bulge, Stalingrad, Iwo Jima, El Alamein, and Kursk. While historical scholarship of the 
World War II generally focuses on the war’s grand military engagements, it is imperative to note 
that Allied and Axis intelligence units battled for supremacy in a war of deception. The Double 
Cross system employed by the British military intelligence division (MI-5) was, virtually from 
the war’s onset, successful in overwhelming its German opponent, the Abwehr by turning its 
agents into supportive double agents. Traditional historiography follows the classic spy narrative 
and credits the success of MI-5 to its daring agents, brilliant creators, or stalwart handlers who 
used wit and guile to deceive their German adversary. In this thesis I will argue that the success 
of the Double Cross system should be attributed to more than solely the actions of the Double 
Cross team. Though the operatives played an invaluable role, the existence of an overriding, 
well-structured system determined their success. By examining the uniqueness of the Double 
Cross system, this thesis will seek to illustrate that the victorious outcome of the British in the 
intelligence war was due to their tireless effort to perfect a system of counterespionage.  In 
addition to the prewar foundations of British espionage, I will examine their success in terms of 
its comparative ideological advantage over their German adversaries. This thesis evaluates the 
glamourizing myth of individual performance that plagues all of today’s World War II 
scholarship and rejects its premises in favor of a modified approach that holds the systemic 
advantage of the Double Cross system as being of equal importance as the achievements of its 
personnel.  By examining the system not only will the myth of individual supremacy be 
overturned, but also the system’s lasting legacies can be evaluated. The importance of the 
Double Cross system lies with the success MI-5 had during World War Two and its use as the 
blueprint for intelligence services moving forward after 1945.  
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“Tangle within tangle, plot and counter plot, ruse and treachery, cross and double-cross, true 
agent, false agent, double agent, gold and steel, the bomb, the dagger and firing party, were 
interwoven in many a texture so intricate as to be incredible and yet true.”1 
  
 -Winston Churchill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1
 Winston Churchill Quoted in: Ben Macintyre, Double Cross: The True Story of the D-day Spies (New 
York: Crown, 2012), Cover Page. 
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The Double Cross System 
 
 8 
Abwehr Code broken by Double Cross 
 
Baseword: CONSTANTINOPLE 
 
Give the baseword a numerical position within the alphabet and multiply by the date in which a 
transmission is intended (The Eighth will be used for this example): 
 
C   O   N   S   T   A   N   T    I    N   O    P   L   E 
2    9    6  12  13  1    7   14   4    8   10  11   5   3 
         8 
_______________________________________ 
23  6    8  97  05  3    7   15   8    4   80   92   2   4 
 
Write the alphabet giving each letter its number 1-26 
 
A  B  C  D  E  F  G  H  I   J    K    L    M    N    O    P    Q    R    S    T    U    V    W    X    Y    Z 
1   2   3   4   5  6  7  8   9 10   11  12    13   14   15  16   17   18  19   20  21   22   23    24   25   26 
 
Transmission Requested: “I Have Arrived in Good Health” 
 
Auxiliary Notes: First five letters are ‘F’ which denotes the agent is operating on his own free 
will, if pressured the F’s were to be omitted.  
 
Method to Code: 
Add ‘F’ (the sixth letter in the alphabet) to the two above it, making 8, and selecting the 8th letter 
in the alphabet (H). In the second instance ‘F’ again added to 3, making 9, which is denoted by 
‘I’. The method is continued and signed with the name of the agent (in this case Fritz which is 
Agent Zigzag). 
The groups of five are then read horizontally 
 
2    3    6    8   9   7   0   5   3   7   1   5   8    4    8   0   9   2   2   4 
___________________________________________________ 
f    f     f     f    f    I   H  A  V  E   x   A  R   R    I   V  E   D  A  N 
h   i      l     n   o   p   h   f    y   l    y   f   z    v    q    v   n   f   c    r 
D  I     N    G  O  O  D  H   E  A   L  T  H   x    F    R   I  T   Z   x 
f   l      t      o   x   v  d   m   h   h   m  y  p    b    n    r     r  v   b    b 
 
Thus: HILNO PHFYL YFZVQ VNFCR FLTOX VDMHH MYPBN RRVBB 
This is the example of the code that Double Cross received from the interrogation of Edward 
Chapman, Codenamed: Agent Zigzag.2 
                                                        
2
 Found in Macintyre, Zigzag, introduction but taken from KV 2/455, Interrogation of Edward Chapman. 
KV stands for the file location within the British National Archives. Intelligence Files of the Double 
Cross System are coded with KV. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“What is significant in the Double Cross system is the system itself. In a philosophical sense it is 
the “game” which counts. Certainly it was what counted for the soldier who splashed ashore on 
Sicily or in Normandy. Yet in the end there was an enemy to be induced down the wrong path, 
wrong for them but right for us. Fortunately they went.”3 
- Norman Homes Pearson 
During World War II, the Allied and Axis powers engaged in a war of espionage that 
forever cemented the need for counterintelligence and espionage units in a country’s arsenal. 
Organizations such as MI-5 (Britain’s domestic military intelligence agency), MI-6 (Britain’s 
foreign military intelligence agency), the Abwehr (German military intelligence), the Special 
Operations Executive (Britain’s special operations and covert force), and the Office of Strategic 
Services (America’s special operations and covert force) carried out clandestine operations that 
greatly affected the outcome of the war.  Deception proved to be the greatest asset of the Allied 
and Axis intelligence organizations. Spies who could gather information and in turn, if the 
circumstances called for it, give misinformation were highly valued. Within the context of 
counterintelligence, the Abwehr and MI-5 battled for supremacy in the war for deception. It is 
important to note that these organizations had sufficient help from other intelligence divisions 
during the war, but the task of counterintelligence fell to MI-5 and the Abwehr.  
To send misinformation to the enemy, a spy had to be turned. Double agents became the 
focus of MI-5, and through their Double Cross system, the Abwehr suffered defeat after defeat. 
The Abwehr focused on espionage, unaware that the entirety of their spy network in Britain had 
been compromised. What the British were able to accomplish was a near impossible feat. John 
Masterman, head of the XX committee and architect of the Double Cross system boasted: “We 
                                                        
3
 Norman Homes Pearson Quoted in: J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System: The Incredible True 
Story of How Nazi Spies Were Turned into Double Agents (New York: Lyons Press, 2000), 12. 
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actively ran and controlled the German espionage system in [Britain].”4 After the Germans 
turned over their intelligence records at the conclusion of the war, it was clear that Masterman’s 
account was far from propaganda as the Double Cross system had positively tracked and 
neutralized all but four of the Abwehr agents.5 The Double Cross system became a filter that 
separated spies willing to shift allegiance from stalwart fanatics that valued the Nazi cause over 
their own lives. The Double Cross system became the paramount achievement of any 
counterintelligence unit in World War II.  
The results of the Double Cross system are even more impressive, culminating in the 
successful deception of the Führer in Operation Fortitude and the D-Day landings in Normandy 
and Sicily. Modern day scholarship and historiography puts the success of the Double Cross 
system in the hands of the operatives and the creators of the system who walked a fine line 
between life and death in a game of deception. The agents’ heroics and creators’ genius were 
indeed parts of the reason MI-5 found success in the shadow war, but it is a fallacy to contribute 
the victory of the British to the very people whose trade was, quite literally, treachery. There is a 
far more rational explanation for the success of the Double Cross system and the associated 
success of MI-5 and the Allied forces.  
By first reviewing the state of the intelligence war leading up to World War II’s outbreak, 
this thesis will reveal that the foundation laid by MI-5 in the early years of the war was 
fundamental to the Double Cross system’s success. Modern war’s need for deception, the 
cracking of the enigma code, and Britain’s pilot double agent, Agent Snow, all provided the 
necessary components for the Double Cross system to flourish. Furthermore, this thesis will 
                                                        
4
 J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System: The Incredible True Story of How Nazi Spies Were Turned 
into Double Agents (New York: Lyons Press, 2000), 3. 
5
 Terry Crowdy, Deceiving Hitler: Double Cross and Deception in World War II (Oxford: Osprey, 2008), 
77. 
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demonstrate that the system was established in two phases: the first phase being Agent Snow, 
and the second being all of the following agents who were subjected to the lessons MI-5 learned 
as a result of Agent Snow. Next, the thesis will outline MI-5’s operation of the Double Cross 
system to illuminate the importance of its structure. Finally, by looking at MI-5’s need to perfect 
a system of intelligence and the failures of German espionage, it will be clear that more than 
spies contributed to victory. In doing so, the evidence will show that the prewar foundations 
established by MI-5 in the counterintelligence field, the structure of the Double Cross system, 
and German failures led not only to the success of the Double Cross system, but also to the 
success of British intelligence in the espionage war of World War II. There is no question that 
the men and women of Double Cross are important, but so is the system itself.  
Confirmation of this thesis’ claims will come through the examination of primary sources 
containing firsthand accounts from MI-5 officers, agents, and auxiliary staff. The primary 
sources that are used throughout the thesis are MI-5 files that are comprised of operative 
interrogations, missions, and communications. They will be used to show how the Double Cross 
system handled and employed each agent. The files reveal that the Double Cross system plays 
more of a key role in the success of MI-5 than current scholarship claims. Many secondary 
sources have organized their research of the primary sources that I intend to use. The difference 
between this thesis and the current secondary sources is the conclusions that are drawn from the 
sources. In sum, the structure of the system, not only the operatives, was the key to success. 
Popular historiography is correct in assuming the agents, handlers, and officers of Double Cross 
were necessary for success, but it only accounts for half of the story. These sources contain agent 
files and mission reports, which will be used to show the success individual agents contributed to 
the larger war effort. The primary sources have been used in many of the secondary sources that 
 12
this thesis utilizes. The difference with the primary sources is that instead of providing a history 
of what an agent accomplished, which is the case in many of the works on Double Cross, they 
are used to show how the agent was benefited by the standardization of the Double Cross system. 
Secondary sources will be used to create a framework to understand the primary sources. In 
conclusion, this thesis will prove that the classic spy myth intertwined in narratives of the Double 
Cross system is inaccurate in assuming that victory came only at the hands of daring agents or 
brilliant handlers who were trained in the art of deception. In reality, the spies and handlers were 
only part of the story.  The well-founded, systematic campaign of deception on behalf of the 
British and the failure of German intelligence created the perfect conditions for Double Cross 
and British intelligence to achieve victory in the shadow war of World War II.  
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FOUNDATIONS OF DOUBLE CROSS 
 The narratives that encompass a majority of scholarship on World War II force many to 
fall for a romanticized version of the war.  The conflict was not the good war many people 
perceive it to be. It was a ruthless war of annihilation that destroyed Europe. Like the perception 
of the war, many things were not as they seemed. The Double Cross system and the deception 
campaign run by MI-5 were deemed successful in the hands of the people who created, ran, or 
worked within the system. This narrative is only partially true. The people who made Double 
Cross run are indeed worthy of credit.  Part of the success of Double Cross, however, was 
founded on external factors. The wisdom gained from counterintelligence operations from 1909 
to 1939 gave the World War II era MI-5 a strong understanding of what was needed to conduct 
counterespionage operations. Furthermore, the test case for the Double Cross system, Agent 
Snow, was invaluable in educating MI-5 to wartime demands of running double agents despite 
Agent Snow’s operation ending in shambles. Finally, the work of decoding the German cipher 
known as Enigma, or Ultron, by the brilliant men and women at Bletchley Park gave MI-5 the 
ability to exploit every German agent operating on English soil. These three prewar external 
factors, along with the structure of the Double Cross system, and German failures, coupled with 
the people of the system, contributed to the victory of MI-5 over their Abwehr enemies. Without 
the prewar events to prompt a strong foundation, the Double Cross system would not have been 
as effective as it was. Again, the personnel of Double Cross were undoubtedly important, but so 
was the system.  
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The Classic Spy Narrative: Double Cross’ Historiography 
“In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.”6 
-Winston Churchill 
 
 The scholarship on World War II is some of the most in-depth and extensive knowledge 
on any war to date. The Double Cross system is no different. Agents, handlers, MI-5 brass, and 
historians have written about the greatest counterintelligence coup of the war. Juan Pujol wrote 
his daring spy memoir entitled Operation Garbo: The Personal Story of the Most Successful Spy 
of World War II. John Masterman published a personal account of the system and its operations 
from 1940-1945 in the book The Double Cross system: The Incredible Story of How Nazi Spies 
were Turned into Double Agents. Ben Macintyre romanticized the system and its spies in works 
like Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies and Agent Zigzag: A True Story of Nazi 
Espionage, Love, and Betrayal. Terry Crowdy captured the important moments of the 
intelligence war in Deceiving Hitler: Double Cross and Deception in World War II. In addition 
to these colorful accounts, Guy Liddell, MI-5’s B Division Head, published his personal diaries. 
These extensive works all show the problems, schemes, and triumphs of the Double Cross 
system through the glamorized description that plagues World War II scholarship. Each speaks 
to the brilliance of the agents, the handlers, or the men who created Double Cross.  
 Therein lies the problem with the existing scholarship on Double Cross. Were the British 
really successful solely because of their daring operatives and ingenuity, or was there more at 
play? There is no doubt that the agents, regardless of how unconventional they may have been, 
as well as the masterminds of the Double Cross system who spun a web of lies that caught the 
Germans during the war, are due with some credit. They were important parts of a system that 
helped win the espionage war. Current scholarship neglects the importance of the structure of the 
                                                        
6
 Winston Churchill Quoted in: Thaddeus Holt, The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second 
World War (New York: Scribners, 2004), 504. 
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Double Cross system and the pre-war intelligence victories won by MI-5. Without these 
invaluable events aided through German failure, the victory would have never been great, 
regardless of how daring the spies or brilliant the creators were.  
 The lack of inquiry into the source of Double Cross’ success can be found in the 
perception of the war. Today, we perceive World War II as a good war that was fought by good 
men. No one exemplifies these notions more than the British and their ostensibly gentlemanly 
style of warfare. Historians simply credited the success of the British intelligence service to 
innovation and patriotism. Espionage in World War II was conducted through uncharted territory 
and British domination was not because of MI-5’s unparalleled excellence.  
 Juan Pujol, codenamed Agent Garbo, published a book of his wartime exploits called 
Operation Garbo: The Personal Story of the Most Successful Spy of World War II. This memoir 
is one of the few written by a double agent who is arguably the most important Double Cross 
agent in the war. Garbo’s memoir, packed full of bold stories of his spy days, places the success 
of the Double Cross system and Operation Bodyguard in the hands of agents. Garbo continually 
reminisces of all that he did, operationally, to contribute to the success of Operation Bodyguard 
from his initial deception of the Abwehr to creating his vast, fictional intelligence network. 
Garbo did play an instrumental part in Operation Bodyguard, but was not the biggest reason for 
success. Garbo reminisces, “My main pride and satisfaction, now I look back, has been the 
knowledge that I greatly contributed to the reduction of casualties among the thousands – the 
tens of thousands – of servicemen fighting to hold the Normandy beaches.”7 Garbo’s work must 
be looked at through his personal bias that placed success at the hands of agents. Agents made 
the system work, but were not the basis for Double Cross’ success. 
                                                        
7
 Juan Pujol and Nigel West, Operation Garbo: The Personal Story of the Most Successful Spy of World 
War II (London: Biteback, 2011), Amazon Kindle E-Book Location 3333 of 4703. 
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John Masterman, head of the Twenty Committee tasked with running the Double Cross 
system, recorded the system’s wartime exploits in The Double Cross system: The Incredible 
Story of How Nazi Spies were Turned into Double Agents. Masterman provides an overview of 
the Double Cross system from its theory, to its practice all the way through to the Double Cross’ 
operations in the last year of the war. The account is invaluable because it comes from the man 
who was not only present during the Double Cross operations, but the person tasked with the 
system’s oversight. As any author writing about his own exploits would, Masterman places the 
success of the system with the men who ran it stating, “It was the professional officers of MI-5 
who were responsible for the plans . . . to the professionals, therefore, the credit for the success 
of double-cross work should go.”8 Although Masterman does not focus on the agents as his 
associates do, he still places success with one aspect of Double Cross. Masterman’s theory is not 
wrong, but it is also far from complete.  The information Masterman provides on Double Cross is 
vital as long as his bias is accounted for. Nonetheless, it is a stellar piece of Double Cross 
history. 
 Ben Macintyre’s Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies and Agent Zigzag: A 
True Story of Nazi Espionage, Love, and Betrayal are examples of books that do not show the 
Double Cross agents as the legendary spies that other authors claim them as. These two books 
still romanticize the agents and emphasize their heroics as a sizeable part of Double Cross’ 
success. Macintyre uses these two books to create, much like Masterman, a thorough history of 
the Double Cross system, its operations, and its agents. Macintyre claims “The D-Day spies were 
not traditional warriors. None carried weapons, yet the soldiers who did owed the spies a huge 
and unconscious debt.”9 Macintyre, like Masterman, is not wrong, just not completely right. 
                                                        
8
 Masterman, The Double-Cross System, XV. 
9
 Ben Macintyre, Double Cross: The True Story of the D-day Spies (New York: Crown, 2012), 6. 
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These two books provide the most in depth view at what specific agents contributed to the war 
effort, and when reconciled with the other biased sources, act as important pieces of 
counterespionage history.  
Terry Crowdy is the last prominent author on the subject of the deception of Hitler. 
Deceiving Hitler: Double Cross and Deception in World War II is another overview of the 
Double Cross system and the victories it achieved. Crowdy, much like his cohorts, falls victim to 
idealizing the agents and their operations. By acknowledging these biases and their effects on the 
author’s recommendation of who should receive the credit for Double Cross’ victory, it is clear 
that the source of success is spread between multiple factors. The agents, their handlers, and 
Double Cross’ creators all played important roles in the campaign of deception. The answer lies, 
however, in the examination of not only the agents, but also on the battlefield where Double 
Cross can be evaluated and analyzed. British agents led assaults on Nazi ideology and undertook 
missions that most men would not. Heroics are worthy of partial credit, but there is a much 
deeper catalyst for success, one part German failure and one part British structure. The triumphs 
lie not solely with men, but with the system, the intelligence foundation before the war, and the 
ideological values running rampant in World War II. 
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Swapping Bullets for Daggers: The Evolution of British Intelligence from 1909-1939 
 
“All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem 
unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make 
the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.” 
-Sun Tzu10 
 
The masterminds behind British intelligence set themselves up for success before World 
War II began by engaging in counterintelligence.  Counterintelligence is a necessity in any 
country’s arsenal. Espionage tells us our enemies’ secrets and plots, but what of are own? This is 
where misinformation through counterintelligence becomes necessary. In the early 1900’s the 
balance of power throughout Europe was shifting. Germany was acquiring power at a rapid rate, 
which set up its inevitable clash with other European powers, namely the British. The British still 
were the dominant Naval power, and in a strong economic position within Europe. Due to the 
concern of a potentially worthy foe, England quickly established a system in 1909 to evaluate the 
threat of foreign espionage within its borders. 
The Committee for Imperial Defense activated a subcommittee to discover the possibility 
of a German espionage ring operating within England. On July 24, 1909, the subcommittee 
reported, “the evidence which was produced left no doubt in the minds of the subcommittee that 
an extensive system of German espionage exists in this country and that we have no organization 
for keeping in touch with that espionage and for accurately determining its extent or objective.”11 
The committee’s response for this harrowing conclusion was to create the Secret Service Bureau, 
which was restructured to form MI-5 to deal with domestic issues, and MI-6 to deal with foreign 
issues.12  
                                                        
10
 Sun-tzu and Samuel B. Griffith, The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 6. 
11
 Christopher M. Andrew, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2009), 3. 
12
 Ibid., 28. 
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Help with reporting cases of German espionage came from unusual sources within 
England. William Le Queux, the author of The Invasion of 1910 and Spies of the Kaiser: Plotting 
the Downfall of England, is responsible for awakening the British public to the threat of a 
German invasion, which subconsciously helped pave the way for counterespionage in the Great 
War, the interwar period, and World War II. Le Qeuex and five other men banded together and 
formed a voluntary spy hunter organization that paid its own expenses to gather information on 
alleged German agents.13 The Daily Mail serialized Le Qeuex’s two works of fiction into a mass 
circulation newspaper that had special maps in each issue to denote what province the Germans 
would be invading that day.14 The paranoia led to rival authors who wanted to cash in at the 
expense of German militarism, which only exposed more people to the idea, no matter how 
seemingly fictitious that German spies were operating in England.  
The public’s response to the alleged German espionage ring was substantial. In 
researching the potential German spy ring, the subcommittee of 1909 was told that five cases of 
German espionage were reported to the War Office in 1907, forty-seven were reported in 1908, 
and twenty-four in the first months of 1909 with only one report uncovering an actual enemy 
agent.15 German files verified that Paul Brodtmann, reported in 1909, was sent to England to 
report on British battleships in London. Although the majority of reports were false, the 
uncovering of Brodtmann proved that there were German spies operating in England. 
By the beginning of World War I, MI-5 had grown in power and was better financed than 
it ever had been. In 1914, spy mania led to the Defense of the Realm Act, which gave the 
government powers resembling martial law. These precautions led MI-5 to set up a registry of 
suspected persons that was kept continually up to date. By 1917, the registry included 250,000 
                                                        
13
 Ibid., Location 495 of 24391. 
14
 Ibid., Location 510 of 24391. 
15
 Ibid., Location 651 of 24391. 
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cards with 27,000 personal files of suspected agents.16 In addition to the registry, MI-5 was able 
to open mail and intercept cables of suspected agents, adding even more tools to track and 
control enemy spies.  
Up until the winter of 1914, German spies were exclusively run through Nacrichten-
Abteilung, but as the war progressed the German Intelligence division, Sektion IIIb, started 
deploying spies from their spy school in occupied Antwerp.17 Because MI-5 could open mail, 
three arrests were made in 1915 including one man named Karl Müller.18 Müller’s arrest went 
unknown to his German handlers, which gave MI-5 their first opening to impersonate him and 
send false operation reports and exaggerated funding requests. The success MI-5 had in the 
beginning of the Great War minimized the German espionage threat in the latter half the conflict. 
The success actually diverted manpower and resources from MI-5 to aid in domestic and foreign 
subversion because no one feared German espionage.  
As with any military drawdown after a war, personnel and budgets are slashed. MI-5’s 
budget was cut nearly a third of its size and went from a wartime staff of 844 officers to 35 in 
1920.19 MI-5’s necessary secrecy and lack of political acumen left them in a low position on 
politicians’ lists of necessary agencies. However, MI-5 uncovered Soviet agents within the 
British government in 1929, which proved their necessity in the defense of the realm. In 1931, 
MI-5 was converted from a military organization to a fully civilian staffed one.20 The thought of 
German espionage only arose again to MI-5 in 1927. 
                                                        
16
 Ibid., Location 1549 of 24391. 
17
 Ibid.  
18
 Ibid.,67. 
19
 Ibid., 117. 
20
 Ibid., 130.  
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The British SIS (security service) developed a German translator and administrative 
assistant that supplied a list with nearly 70 German agents operating in Britain.21 MI-5 kept the 
Germans on their radar, but it was not until the future head of MI-5’s B Division 
(counterespionage division), Guy Liddell visited Germany in 1933 that the threat of Nazism 
became concerning. Though Liddell incorrectly assumed the internment he witnessed at Dachau 
was a passing phase of Hitler’s political agenda, MI-5 took the Nazi party’s takeover of Germany 
more seriously. In 1937, the first double agent since World War I was put into action. 
Major Christopher ‘Mad Major’ Draper was a World War I pilot who in 1933, was 
approached by a German representative asking if he could supply intelligence on the RAF.22 
Draper revealed the proposal to the Security Service, which activated him as a double agent. 
Unfortunately MI-5 did not have the ability to efficiently assemble the scripted information for 
Draper to give the Abwehr. By 1937, unimpressed with the quality of information, the Abwehr 
ceased communications with Draper.  
MI-5 was short staffed and unprepared to handle the rigors of controlling double agents. 
MI-5 wanted to replicate its success in World War I, no matter how initially haphazard, but its 
weak infrastructure proved to be too big of challenge to overcome. What MI-5 did have was the 
knowledge of the steps needed to accurately track and control German agents from its 
experiences in World War I. Without knowing it, MI-5 created a strong understanding and 
foundation of how to conduct counterespionage. All it needed now was the resources, manpower, 
and something that could get MI-5 a jumpstart on tracking enemy Abwehr agents. When War 
came, so did the funding and manpower, but the jumpstart ended up being an agent named Snow 
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An Undesirable Affair: Agent Snow 
“The deceiver by stratagem leaves it to the person himself whom he is deceiving to 
commit the errors of understanding which at last, flowing into one result suddenly change the 
nature of things in his eyes.”23 
-Carl Von Clausewitz 
 
Figure 1 24 
 Agent Snow was, by all means, a peculiar and unconventional spy. Arthur George Owens 
was a “shifty-looking, short, bony-faced, Welshman.”25 Owens represented the first phase of the 
Double Cross system and was the only agent to be recruited within a structure similar to the 
prewar system. By the end of his tenure, although a mediocre deceiver, his case aided Bletchley 
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Park code breakers in cracking the Abwehr Enigma and set MI-5 on the right track for success. 
Owens’ career ended in dismissal from MI-5, but not before providing important lessons to his 
handler Thomas “Tar” Robertson on the troublesome nature of double agency and according to 
the head of MI-5’s B division deputy Dick White, “Saved us from absolute darkness on the 
subject of German espionage.”26 Owens’ story is as important to the success of Double Cross as 
the cracking of the Enigma or MI-5’s prewar work with counterespionage. Snow’s case shows 
the human aspect of the Double Cross system was necessary, but how the system was changed 
after Snow’s departure shows how important the structure of Double Cross was.  
 Owens was born in 1899, emigrated from Britain to Canada, and returned back to Britain 
in 1933.27 He was constantly moving, always unsettled, and was employed as an electrical 
engineer and a travelling salesman. Owens, despite his shortcomings, was a masterful engineer. 
He patented an electric storage cell, which made him a client of the Admiralty and the German 
Navy, the Kriegsmarine.28 The limits on U-boat production, along with many other restrictions 
on German military power required by the  Treaty of Versailles, were broken by Hitler’s regime. 
By 1935, this relaxation of the terms resulted in an increase in U-boat production. To monitor the 
building of the U-boats, the Admiralty needed a third party, one who regularly travelled to Baltic 
States for business. Owens often travelled to Hamburg and Kiel to sell his patented batteries that 
could extend the life of a U-boat.29 Furthermore, Owens had passed information to the Admiralty 
of what he witnessed on his trips, and in 1936, Owens began to profit from this information; it 
was at this moment when Agent Snow was born.30  
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 Snow always had an identity problem. He did not view himself as British, but as a radical 
Welshman. Snow and his initial case officer did not get along, and this difficulty pushed him 
toward betraying England in 1936 “in revenge for centuries of abuse against his homeland 
[Wales].”31 Snow had an impeccable resume that qualified him for double agency. He had 
contacts in the Admiralty, MI-5, and made trips to RAF stations regularly. German intelligence, 
as expected, received Snow’s request with expediency and excitement. The Abwehr immediately 
set him up with an address in Hamburg, Postfach 629, to mail his findings in code. 32 
Unfortunately for the Germans, Christopher Draper, the pilot who became an interwar spy, had 
compromised the address in favor of the British.33 MI-5 immediately knew of Snow’s attempted 
treachery, and declared him an espionage suspect.  
 In November 1936, the Security Service terminated his tenure as an agent because of the 
lackluster results he brought to his British handlers and his unforthcoming nature of his 
relationship with the Germans.34 In the following month, German agents approached Snow. They 
not only introduced him to fellow spies in England, but also offered to solve his financial woes 
(which had been a source of his spotty intelligence work) if he spied on the RAF. In late 
December 1936, Snow decided to tell MI-5 of his pending offer with German intelligence. 
Snow’s questionnaire from the Abwehr instructed him to acquire samples of RAF technology 
learn about the Sperry auto pilot system, RAF organization, deployment patterns, ammo and fuel 
dumps, and take pictures of the electronic height finders used by RAF squadrons.35 The British 
decided to reenlist Snow as an agent, which came at the perfect time because Snow’s German 
handler had changed. 
                                                        
31
 Crowdy, Deceiving Hitler, 14. 
32
 West and Madoc, The Double Life, 5. 
33
 Masterman, Double Cross, 37. 
34
 West and Madoc, The Double Life, 7. 
35
 Ibid., 8.  
 25
 In the summer of 1937, Snow met his new handler, named “Dr. Rantzau,” a director of an 
import-export business in Germany. Rantzau, however, was a fictitious cover. He was actually 
Captain Nikolas Ritter, Chief of Air Intelligence in the Abwehr espionage department.36 MI-5’s 
reemployment of Snow came with certain conditions. MI-5 did not trust Snow, and rightfully so. 
Snow eventually came clean to MI-5 about his German ties, albeit with a fraction of truth. The 
flirtatious relationship Snow had with the truth was a grave lesson for the future of the Double 
Cross system. From then on MI-5 had to tail Snow wherever he went. This was an inconvenience 
and a strain on the manpower of MI-5, but it did yield important information. Snow, surprisingly, 
never informed Ritter of his reemployment, and during his visits to Germany, Snow reported 
learning espionage skills on each visit, like operating wireless transmitters.37 Before the war 
started, in his own account, Snow boasted that the Germans had set him up with his own wireless 
operator.38 Snow also claimed that he had pieced together an espionage network of 15 informants 
and agents.39 At the outbreak of the war, MI-5 had a double agent, although somewhat 
untrustworthy, who gave MI-5 a decent head start over their Abwehr counterpart.  
 It is important to note that Snow never helped one side out of clear allegiance or 
patriotism. For Snow, it was clearly a money game; there is evidence of him selling secrets to 
both sides. Snow sold secrets because MI-5 would allow him to have a longer leash, and the 
Abwehr also paid him a hefty sum for his troubles. In 1939, Snow gave MI-5 the names of the 
last three German agents operating in England.40 Snow also aided in the deciphering of 
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Abwehr’s Enigma code. Snow’s wireless set offered an enormous opportunity for the decoders at 
Bletchley Park. 
 The largest breakthrough acquired from Snow was the manipulation of agent codes. The 
codes given to Snow were used by code breakers to decrypt other German spies’ cyphers. Once 
Bletchley Park had deciphered a code, MI-5 arrested the corresponding agent. This game of cat 
and mouse continued well on into the war, and provided an extensive pool of candidates for the 
Double Cross system. Without Snow’s codes, the code breakers would have not had a ‘ground 
zero’ to begin reconstructing the Abwehr codes. Despite all of Snow’s contributions to Double 
Cross and the war effort, his machinations spiraled out of control and ended in the latter months 
of 1940. 
 Snow’s undoing was his lust for lying. On 16 March 1940, Snow met a man named 
Walter Dicketts, who he tried to recruit as a British agent. Over the course of the night after the 
two had met at a pub, Snow told Dicketts wild stories of his life as a diamond trader and tried to 
befriend the ex-intelligence officer from World War I. Dicketts, however, believed that Snow 
was a German agent, and in the following weeks tailed him, hoping to acquire his job since his 
post war life had been anything but spectacular. After reporting that possibility of a German spy 
in England, Dicketts was recruited as an agent with the codename “Celery,” after being sent by 
MI-5 to meet Robertson.41 Robertson, distrustful of Snow, sent Celery along on his trip to Lisbon 
to meet Dr. Randzau. Celery played the part of an RAF technician, so Snow could easily sell his 
worth to his German handler. Celery secretly had two missions: the first was to corroborate the 
loyalty of Snow and the second was to “penetrate the Abwehr as far as possible and get into 
Germany.”42 What happened after their arrival is a tale of two different stories. 
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 During debriefing, Snow informed Roberston that he had indeed met Randzau and he had 
been accused of being in league with the British, to which he replied: “That’s perfectly true”, and 
then was given 10,000 £, and concealed explosives.43 It was clear, as usual, that Snow was lying 
about the events that actually took place and since he was still in employment of the Abwehr, he 
most likely had not been compromised. Once again, Snow proved the double agent game was 
extremely volatile and unpredictable.  
Celery had an extremely different take on the event of the pair’s Lisbon trip. Celery 
described meeting Randzau in a bar with Snow where Randzau propositioned him to come to 
Germany to be debriefed about the RAF without the accompaniment of Snow. Celery spent three 
and a half weeks in Germany with Randzau, being interrogated on his knowledge of the RAF. He 
told Robertson that the state of Germany was quite good and that civilian morale was still high 
despite the allied bombing campaigns.44 Celery also learned many things about the German 
intelligence service’s state and German invasion plans, which planned to neutralize the Navy 
with mines and assured that the RAF were mediocre bombers.45 Celery proved to be a better 
source of information than Snow, which marked the end of Snow’s career.  
 Snow was a constant liar and on multiple occasions, put Celery’s life in danger out of 
spite. By this time there were more agents that had been recruited to Double Cross, 
foreshadowing the end of Snow’s services. In 1941, Masterman, Robertson, Liddell, and White 
sat down and decided on the termination of Snow’s services because he had failed to warn 
Celery prior to his arrival in Lisbon that he had told Randzau of their betrayal.46 True to form, 
Snow tried to spin a web of lies to force MI-5 to keep him as an agent. The excerpt below from 
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the conversation with Snow shows just how dealing with double agents proved to be an immense 
task: 
Robertson: You did not tell Celery that the game was blown before he went into   
                   Germany. 
Snow: Well, I did tell him before he went to Germany. 
Robertson: You definitely sent a man on a dangerous mission. 
Snow: That’s a lie. 
Robertson: You sent him knowingly, I maintain, to put the worst construction on it, to his  
                   death probably.  
Snow: I did not. I did nothing of the kind, 
Robertson: But I gathered that this exchange of confidences between Celery and you took  
                  place, according to you before you went to the meeting? 
Snow: What confidences do you mean? 
Robertson: Informing him the game was up. 
Snow: I believe I told him in the room. 
Robertson: In which room? 
Snow: But I know I told him in front of the Doctor, definitely. In the room there. 
Masterman: Doesn’t it seem to you that it was a very treacherous act, to say the least of it,  
                     not to tell him before he got to the Doctor? 
Snow: I am positive I told him before he went to the Doctor? 
 Masterman: Positive you told him before he went to the Doctor? 
 Snow: Yes.47 
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Snow sealed his fate. A wireless message was sent back over his radio set stating that Snow had 
given up the espionage game and was gravely ill. The Germans replied that they would continue 
to await his transmissions when he recovered. Snow was interned at Dartmoor Prison until the 
end of the conflict, when he emigrated to Canada.48 
 Even though his spy days were over, Snow was an invaluable asset to the success of 
Double Cross. He helped crack the Abwehr code, provided information on enemy agents in 
England, and taught MI-5 and Robertson, the future handler of Double Cross, the essentials of 
running a double agent. Without his contributions, Double Cross may have never gotten the start 
that it did and MI-5 may have never learned what it needed to run a counterespionage system. 
The worth of Snow is in how he changed the Double Cross system. After his departure the 
structure shifted and without that change all the future double agents could have gone to ruin just 
as Snow did. To see how important the structure is, it necessary to examine the people that 
shaped its creation. For all his faults, Snow is a valuable piece of counterespionage history. He 
alone is the first phase of Double Cross. His end came at the hands of his best asset, lying. He 
showed that the mythmaking historiography is somewhat justified because he was an individual 
who shaped the spy game.  But with Snow’s contributions added to the foundations of counter 
espionage dating back to 1909, MI-5 was well on its way to creating a system that dominated the 
war of deception. MI-5 received another invaluable tool to wage war against the Germans. That 
was the cracking of the Enigma Code, the greatest secret of the war.  
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A PhD’s Game: Breaking the Enigma Code 
“The breaking of the Enigma, the German cipher machine, was the most important 
intelligence triumph of this or any other war.”49 
-Ben Macintyre 
 
Figure 2 50 
 
Tracking of enemy spies is inherently difficult because in order to begin the hunt for an 
agent, one needs a starting point. No tracking can begin unless some clue points the hunter in the 
right direction. The methods that allowed the tracking of enemy agents in World War I was not 
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conducive to the new era of warfare. Opening letters and receiving tips from paranoid citizens 
who might have read too many spy novels would not catch the men under the control of Hitler’s 
spymaster, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. But much like its World War I predecessors, MI-5 
received help in tracking agents from an external source. The breaking of Enigma code was not 
only one of the greatest intelligence victories and closely guarded secret of World War II, but it 
also gave MI-5 the upper hand over the Abwehr.  
 Britain knew that if it could decode the method that the Germans and the rest of the Axis 
powers used to communicate, the course of the war could be altered. The British had set up 
listening posts along the English coastline in an effort to intercept and decode “every signal from 
every captain, commander, military division, battleship, and U-boat.”51 With the greatest minds 
working on outwitting the German coding machine, it was only a matter of time until one side 
outwitted the other. The head of the Enigma project, Commander Edward Travis 
compartmentalized the Enigma project to ensure efficiency in uncovering German secrets. The 
codes were pushed through a sort of assembly line: Code breakers’ sole job was to break the 
code, the machine room was responsible for using decrypted keys of rigged Enigma machines to 
type the messages in German, the translators were responsible for the translation of the message, 
and the Watch would organize and distribute the message to the necessary channels.52 A fifty-
five year old cryptographer, Dilly Knox arrived at Bletchley Park in 1939 and was eventually 
credited with the decryption of the Abwehr codes in the final months of 1940. His work was 
important because the Abwehr code used a slightly different configuration than the more basic 
Axis codes.  
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When Knox broke the Abwehr codes, a multitude of possible courses of action could be 
taken. MI-5 decided to monitor and apprehend the agents for the possibility of double-crossing 
their German handlers. When an agent became compromised and was detained, he or she was 
given a choice to join MI-5 or die at the hands of a firing squad. Most chose life over the defense 
of Nazi ideology.53 The misinformation that the first compromised agent sent back to his handler 
was tracked through the Abwehr network and provided the key for the decryption of their 
modified cypher.54 Once the codes were cracked, MI-5 knew all of the operational agents within 
Britain and could uncover what the Abwehr did and did not know about the Allied war effort. 
The Abwehr codes and “decrypted messages were to prove to the security services that the 
success of an audacious operation known as the Double Cross system was possible.” 55  
 In the first months after the Abwehr codes were broken, the tracking of enemy agents was 
shown to be completely effective. Between 3 September and 12 November of 1940, twenty-five 
agents were sent to England from Germany. One committed suicide, five were executed, fifteen 
were sent to detention facilities, and four became double agents.56 The success of Double Cross 
clearly started with the decrypting of the Abwehr codes.  
 Although the Enigma code is well known today, its contributions to the Allied campaign 
are endless. Sinclair Mckay, author of the Secret Lives of Codebreakers, stated: “From the 
beginning, the desperate need to break the Enigma codes was about much more than simple 
tactical intelligence. It was about survival. To unlock the secrets of Enigma would mean 
penetrating the heart of the enemy’s campaign; . . . the code breakers at Bletchley Park aimed at 
reading the enemy’s every message and, in doing so, potentially trying to anticipate his every 
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move.”57 Because of the efforts of the men and women at Bletchley Park, MI-5 knew all of the 
foreign agents operating on British soil and could track them. The groundwork from World War 
I, Agent Snow’s contributions, and the Enigma set up the foundation for Double Cross to 
succeed. Like Snow, the code breakers gave MI-5 the means to alter the structure of the Double 
Cross system for the better. As current historiography states, the people are important to the 
success of Double Cross. It is true that without the code breakers, MI-5 would not be able to 
boast that they ran the German espionage system within England. Without a system, however, to 
put the work that the men and women of MI-5 produced into action, MI-5 would not be able to 
say they controlled espionage in England. Both parts are needed and the importance of the 
system is constantly forgotten.  
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SHADOW WAR 
MI-5’s prewar triumphs in building a strong counterespionage foundation and breaking 
the Enigma code were only enhanced by the lessons learned from the first Double Cross agent, 
Snow.  He provided a wealth of information, not only in wartime operations, but also lessons in 
human nature. Despite Snow’s spotty service, MI-5 and the War Department knew that 
counterespionage could be a viable source of covert attack. With the German spy network 
compromised, it was only a matter of time before MI-5 controlled all the agents, either by 
detainment or as double agents. With Snow out of the picture and new spies emerging, notably 
Agent Tate, MI-5 got the opportunity to prove the relevance of deception to Allied commanders. 
But, as Snow proved, humans are hard to control. MI-5, after all, was battling Germany’s 
brilliant spymaster, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris.  
But there was more to the Double Cross than just this personality. Clearly, the 
counterespionage division of MI-5 faced an overextended Abwehr. The compartmentalized 
structure of MI-5 was the key to focusing and maximizing the effectiveness of counterespionage 
operations. Finally, the formation of the Twenty Committee (XX committee) provided 
hierarchical context for how the men who ran Double Cross were arranged. The structure of the 
enemy and MI-5 explains why the execution of Double Cross was much more reliant on factors 
beyond the direct control of MI-5 
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Radios and Parachutes:  Counterespionage’s Rise to Relevance 
“Chinese philosopher general Sun Tzu advised that ’Knowledge of the enemy can only be 
obtained by other men.’ If this is the case, and history suggests it is, the study of espionage must 
come out of the shadows. One should always know one’s enemy. More so if it is an enemy 
within.”58 
 
Agent Snow gave MI-5 the ability to prove its relevance. MI-5 realized that double 
agents could give them an advantage in the war. Indeed, it did so through the Normandy 
landings, but without the constant success of Double Cross agents the program may have never 
came to fruition. Counterespionage is chiefly a defensive mechanism used in a time of war. The 
British did indeed use its double agents to find information about Germany, but they were mainly 
sent to spread disinformation and to track the German war machine. The difference between 
British and German intelligence is that the British were systematic. Hitler did little to merge his 
multitude of code breaking agencies into a single entity, and did not require dramatic results 
from the Abwehr.59 Hitler’s offensive nature did not rely on intelligence to react, and thus the 
German war machine kept pushing toward the Atlantic Ocean seemingly without worry. It was 
not until Hitler found himself on the defensive that the lack of a German intelligence foundation 
revealed itself, to his great disadvantage.  MI-5 started making a case for itself to once again be 
the tip of the spear. 
MI-5 had 36 officers in July 1939, a number that rose to 102 by January 1940.60 At the 
outbreak of the war, MI-5 had only been used to dealing with enemy aliens rather than finding 
German agents. In September 1939, MI-5 identified 71,600 enemy aliens and another 400 
suspects that should be interned at the start of the war. MI-5 was tasked to interview each person 
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on the list, vet him or her, and place him or her in a category of A, B, or C. Those in the A were 
to be detained, the B group was allowed to travel with restrictions and permits, and the C group 
was free to go as they pleased.61 
Liddell estimated fourth-fifths of MI-5’s time was spent dealing with alien residents, 
rendering them incapable to handle the important job of counterespionage.62 Even Winston 
Churchill complained, “ . . . the witch-finding activities of MI-5 are becoming an actual 
impediment to the more important work.”63 If MI-5 was to lead the war effort and uncover 
enemy agents, something had to change. An audit of MI-5 in 1941 further demonstrated that MI-
5 experienced organizational and communicative breakdowns that led it to be ill prepared to 
handle the wartime rigors of intelligence. The report documented that B division, the 
counterespionage division of MI-5 under Guy Liddell, had grown to 133 officers, but they were 
spread out in 29 sections, and further put into 70 to 80 subsections.64 MI-5 was consequently put 
under new leadership and restructured. Counterespionage operations fell to the men of B 
Division:  Liddell, White, Robertson, and Masterman. 
B division came to realize an essential truth about double agents: they valued survival 
over fanaticism. Some spies were drawn to deception through their lust for adventure. Others 
served either side equally, and some were killed as soon as they were arrested and detained. 
Before the XX committee of MI-5 created the Double Cross system in 1941, Liddell, White, 
Robertson, and Masterman started unwittingly creating an espionage empire.  
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In 1939, Snow’s case started to produce results. Liddell stated in his diary on 27 October 
1939: “The Snow case is looking promising. Snow and his Welsh friend are to do a course in 
Germany on intelligence and sabotage. It is understood that the Germans are sending messages 
on the back of stamps. Snow brought back with him some instructions on the under side of a 
postage stamp.”65 These small victories afforded MI-5 the insight that the German intelligence 
machine and the Germans could be controlled. On 31 October 1939, Liddell wrote that MI-5 had 
recovered microphotographs of Snow’s questionnaire that was to be turned into a man named 
Eschborn.66 Eschborn was enrolled as a double agent codenamed Dragonfly later that year. The 
failure of Operation Sea Lion (the invasion of Britain) and the Blitz of London finally cemented 
the need for counterespionage agents. 
The Enigma machine provided England with the knowledge that Hitler planned to invade 
in Operation Sea Lion. The code breakers at Bletchley Park intercepted a message stating that 
because England refused to surrender, the Führer decided to obliterate England to prevent it 
being used as a base of operations against the Reich.67 The ensuing blitz was devastating as the 
Luftwaffe, in a three-month span, dropped 17,831 tons of explosives and more than 13,000 
incendiary bombs on English targets.68 The British avoided complete destruction, but parts of 
Britain were decimated. MI-5 used the aerial raids to their advantage by letting their double 
agents report where the Luftwaffe had done considerable damage, which proved their 
creditability to their German handlers. The spies were supposed to give as accurate information 
as possible about the air raids to bolster their credibility and set them up for later and more 
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important deception operations.69 The job done by MI-5, in league with the code breakers at 
Bletchley Park, showed how double agents were as vital to England’s survival as the RAF.  
The rise to relevance for MI-5 and its B division was not an easy one. For the first time 
MI-5 was used, but for the wrong purpose. After trying to balance too many jobs, B division, 
under the restructured MI-5, refocused its efforts on counterespionage. The deception campaign 
surrounding the Blitz and Snow’s contributions to B division made a strong case for its 
importance to the war effort. After the termination of Snow’s services, the structure of Double 
Cross began to come together under Masterman, White, Liddell, and Robertson. B division built 
Double Cross around its enemy, the Abwehr and Hitler’s spymaster, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris. 
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der Feind: Admiral Wilhelm Canaris and the Abwehr 
“From our mistakes we reap the richest harvest. Seen against the reality, they show who 
we were and why.”70 
-Henrich Mann 
 
Figure 3 71 
Admiral Canaris was as integral to the success of double crossing the Germans as the 
agents. Canaris was a brilliant strategist and spymaster for the Germans in World War II. 
Unfortunately, his work does not reflect his brilliance, as the Abwehr continually fell short in the 
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covert war against MI-5. It was not because of incompetence that the Abwehr failed, it was due 
to Canaris’ morality. Canaris died a traitor to the Führer because his opposition to the Nazi 
regime cemented his place as a silent hero to the Allied cause. By using the Abwehr to sabotage 
Hitler’s war effort, the Double Cross system and British intelligence were able to defeat their 
Abwehr enemies and deceive Hitler. Canaris’ biography shows how he played a significant role 
in the British intelligence victory. MI-5 could have never won without an adversary; luckily their 
adversary shared the same enemy as MI-5.  
 Canaris was a German patriot from birth. In 1905, at the age of 18, he joined the German 
Navy, deploying aboard the Dresden as an officer at the outbreak of World War I.72 It was in 
World War I where Canaris found his love for espionage. Canaris was sent to Madrid as a 
German Naval Attaché whose job was to recruit seamen along the docks to supply information 
on neutral nations. Canaris eventually created a network of spies. Showing an aptitude for 
clandestine operations, he used the name Reed Rosas and frequently travelled from private 
residence to hotels, used disguises, and contacted informants using codes and dead drops.73 
World War I supplied him with the knowledge and grit to operate in the shadows for the German 
cause. During the interwar years, Canaris continued to rise in Naval intelligence. As Germany 
continued to radicalize, Canaris adopted a unique definition for what German patriotism really 
meant to him. 
 Canaris thought the future of Germany lay in freedom from the Versailles Treaty and 
freedom from war, believing in the preservation of Germany through peace in the world and 
never betrayed this ideal. From the beginning of his tenure as leader of the Abwehr, he worked to 
counteract Hitler’s nationalist agenda. Captain Franz Leideig confessed after the war that “the 
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Canaris group within the Abwehr was the first united military clique working against Hitler with 
any semblance of a planned programme . . . rebellion existed for many years before the war; it 
actually began in 1934 when Admiral Canaris was put in charge of the Abwehr.”74 Throughout 
1934-1939, Canaris and his network worked to unseat Hitler. In 1939, Canaris came close to 
achieving his goal of German security and prosperity with an attempt to arrest of Hitler. 
Unfortunately for him and his cohorts, their attempt was the last chance they had to avert war 
from within. 
 Hitler ordered the invasion of Poland on 24 August 1939. Canaris and his associates 
knew that something had to be done. The invasion orders were postponed which gave them extra 
time to prevent war. Later that evening, Hitler gave orders to abort the mission to invade Poland. 
Since the invasion order was not agreed to by the Reich cabinet and was deemed 
unconstitutional, Canaris and the conspirators tried to overthrow Hitler by pressuring the police 
to arrest him.75 This request was not carried out, and Hitler, none the wiser, still sat at the head of 
the Reich. Despite this failure, Canaris continued to block Hitler’s war machine for the rest of the 
war. 
 By the time the war began, Canaris knew of Nazi war plans, but also knew that to 
challenge Hitler was suicide. Canaris undermined Hitler where he could in order to prevent the 
war from lasting longer than it had to.  When Canaris witnessed the atrocities of the Nazis, he 
worked even harder to undermine Hitler’s war efforts. Hitler disgusted Canaris when he received 
reports from Abwehr agents of mass murders in Poland and witnessed the war crimes of the SS 
during his time at the front. Canaris informed Wehrmacht General Wilhelm Keitel, “I have 
information that mass executions are being planned in Poland, and that members of the Polish 
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nobility and the Roman Catholic bishops and priests have been singled out for extermination.”76 
The General politely informed Canaris that Hitler ordered the extermination himself. The 
atrocities in Poland were the turning point for Canaris. He worked to undermine the Nazis while 
still conducting successful intelligence operations to avoid suspicion of his treachery.  
The Abwehr itself contained only a small number of dissenters. Of the 13,000 personnel 
in 1939, only 50 were active conspirators.77 Canaris was in control, however, and strategically 
worked to undermine Hitler. Canaris still made improvements to the Abwehr organization. Once 
Canaris took control of the Abwehr, he faced many problems similar to the ones MI-5 dealt with 
at the beginning of the war. The service swelled rapidly when Hitler expanded the army in 1934. 
Canaris also had to reconcile the multiple missions the Abwehr was tasked to provide. Before 
taking control, the Abwehr dealt with all intelligence needs of Germany. After some time as the 
head of the Abwehr, Canaris restructured it to deal solely with espionage.  
Before his changes were accomplished, the Abwehr was made up of six groups. Group 
one was army espionage, group two the cipher center, group three was counterespionage, group 
four dealt with sabotage and uprisings, group five-handled naval intelligence, and group six was 
air force espionage. After the reorganization, it was clear Canaris was focused on espionage. The 
military espionage groups were renamed as Abwehr One, or sabotage, and uprisings became 
Abwehr Two, while counterespionage became Abwehr Three. Canaris also created a central 
section dealing with administration and a foreign branch dealing with the German foreign 
ministry. Section One had 63 officers and was further broken down into group One Army East, 
One Army West, One Army Technical, One Marine, One Luftwaffe, One Luftwaffe Technical, 
and One Economy. Section One coordinated for the field units, known as Abwehrstelle or Ast. 
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The spying was conducted out of these posts, and each post was accountable to Abwehr 
headquarters on the mission directive. Yet they were free to choose how they would accomplish 
the mission. This lack of oversight by Canaris ended up harming the intelligence capabilities of 
each Ast because there were no standards to follow. Through the new reorganization, Canaris 
had centralized authority to serve his ambitions. 78 The restructuring also allowed Canaris to 
strategically select his new department heads. 
 Part of Canaris’ longevity as the German Abwehr chief, despite being anti-Hitler, was his 
ability to handpick his staff. He chose his department heads from German officers who did not 
believe in the ardent Nazism of the times. Canaris also sent the well-qualified Nazi believers to 
posts in Germany that were detached from his main operation. This was how Canaris employed 
pro-Nazis while still carrying out an anti-Nazi campaign. Canaris employed Major Hans Oster to 
head the central division. Oster deplored the Nazis and “had a high sense of honor, abhorred 
corruption, was contemptuous of politicians and, when Nazi excesses became . . . government 
policy, Oster . . . denounced them.”79 Chief of Abwehr section one was Colonel Pikenbrock who, 
like Oster, masked a deep hatred for the Nazis. Together with his department heads, Canaris 
could effectively carry out a covert campaign to undermine the Nazis.   
Because Canaris focused on placing anti-Nazi officers as the heads of the Abwehr, his 
recruiting of operational positions tended to be more pro-Nazi, but of a less stable character. 
Canaris’ one fault in recruitment was failing to fill the operational rungs of the Abwehr with 
competent anti-Nazis, and instead drew from men who “were physically capable but were 
temperamentally unsuitable.”80 Each Ast, with its autonomy, could select agents for specific 
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missions that were not military officers or trained in the art of intelligence. This also led to the 
subpar work of Canaris’ Abwehr because the operational agents were not always properly 
trained or devoted to a cause that ensured their unwavering loyalty. This particular flaw was one 
that the Double Cross system would exploit throughout the war.  
Canaris restructured the Abwehr in order to uphold his ideal of what Germany should be. 
His disdain for the Nazis allowed British intelligence to exploit his spy network during the war. 
The structure of the Abwehr and the beliefs of Canaris were important aspects of the success of 
the Double Cross system. The missions that Canaris ran and their failures are even more telling 
of how MI-5 was able to route the Germans with such ease.  
Most notably, Canaris betrayed Operation Sealion. Winston Churchill received 
information that Operation Sealion was to take place. Air reconnaissance and ground observers 
did not have a hand in informing Churchill of the impending Nazi attack, nor did the Enigma 
machine, which had yet to break significant strategic codes.81 Canaris knew that the operation 
could still be carried out if he informed the British, but the enemy would have more time to 
prepare.  Canaris also reported British defenses as much stronger than they really were: “The are 
Tunbridge Wells to Beachy Head and also St. Leonard’s is distinguished by a special labyrinth of 
defenses. These defenses, however, are so well camouflaged that a superficial observer on the 
sand hills would not discover anything extraordinary.”82 In reality, these defenses were 
exaggerated by Canaris to dissuade Hitler from invading. Canaris warned more than just 
England. From May 1 to May 7, Canaris sent messages to Switzerland to prepare for an invasion 
by Hitler though his contact known as the “Viking Line”.83  
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The Abwehr did find early success in Operation Nordpol. The British SOE supported the 
Dutch network of resistance during the invasion and occupation of Norway. In November 1941, 
the Head of Netherland Abwehr Operations, Hermann Giskes, captured a Dutch radio transmitter 
and kept it active using codes the Germans had obtained. Nordpol, kept active until 1944 by 
Giskes, resulted in the capture and execution of 50 Dutch and SOE agents.84 Giskes provided 
Canaris with SOE movements in Northern Europe and impeded other spies from entering the 
area for fear of capture and execution. Operation Nordpol was an operation that showed the 
brilliance of Canaris and his Netherland division. Although profoundly successful, Operation 
Nordpol was one of the few accomplishments the Abwehr produced during the war.  
One of the largest failures of the Abwehr was the inaccurate assessment of Russian 
military strength. This failure, seemingly insignificant, proves just how many things the Abwehr 
were responsible for. The Abwehr estimated that the Red Army was weak, and did not possess 
the will to fight. By its re-calculation in 1941, the Abwehr declared that the Red Army was 25% 
larger than the initial reports.85 Canaris and the Abwehr contributed to the arrogance of the 
Wehrmacht, and were detrimental to Nazi war plans because more resources had to be sent to the 
eastern front. The Abwehr were not only entrenched in an espionage war, but Canaris’ 
centralized hierarchy made it hard to delegate. Canaris attempted to control every aspect of the 
intelligence arsenal. The Abwehr were preoccupied with so many operations that the amount of 
time spent on perfecting espionage in Britain was not nearly enough.  
 The German operations in Ireland would also provide insight into the flaws of the 
Abwehr. The Abwehr in Ireland had confusing objectives, flawed political information, poor 
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selection in recruits, and faulty execution.86  The problems that faced the Abwehr in Ireland were 
comparable to the flaws of the organization as a whole. The Abwehr, as any good enemy of 
England would, believed that the IRA would provide an advantage in spying on the British. The 
Abwehr misjudged the IRA’s capabilities, as they were “amateurs, poorly financed, ill-led, and 
devoted to uncoordinated acts of terrorism and mayhem.”87 Another mistake was the poor choice 
of recruits. For example, the Abwehr’s first Irish agent was a sixty-years-old Irish man who was 
“arthritic, not too bright, and spoke passible English.”88 The agent was chosen for his ability to 
have a cover in Ireland, much like many other Abwehr agents that were employed for their 
ability to have a cover rather than demonstrating an aptitude for espionage. The unfit agents were 
employed by the Ast stations because of the leeway they had in mission planning and execution. 
The final failure of the Abwehr in Ireland, representative of the Abwehr as a whole, was the 
incompetent execution of their objectives. Many of the agents were not trained in spycraft, 
especially the ones sent to Ireland because the Abwehr believed the Irish would be sympathetic 
to their cause. The last Abwehr agent to be captured in Ireland called the German minister 
directly trying to report on espionage activities and was apprehended twenty minutes later by 
Irish police. In his belongings were a date of military convoys and a Dublin map marked with 
German legislation sites on it.89 These untrained agents who made terrible operational mistakes 
led to the downfall of the Abwehr in Ireland and in the rest of the countries where the Abwehr 
operated. Ireland serves as an example of Abwehr incompetence that is representative of the 
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organization as a whole. These shortcomings certainly aided the British in their domination of 
German intelligence throughout the war. 
 The final act of Canaris that resulted in failure of his agents was the insertion of his spies 
into England. German agents were placed into other countries more efficiently because there 
were Abwehr posts already onsite. A detailed map shows main Abwehr stations in Oslo, 
Helsinki, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Hamburg, Berlin, Brussels, Paris, Madrid, Lisbon, Bern, 
Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, Salonika, Istanbul, and Athens.90 These stations were the 
forward operating bases for the spies. As for England, there were no such amenities for agents 
who were sent to infiltrate the British, leaving them alone without help. The first German agents 
that Canaris employed were two radical Nazis from the Danish border. Hans Schmidt and Jorgen 
Björnson, a mechanic and electrician respectively, each spoke German and fair English.91 After 
their preliminary interviews with Dr. Randzau, they learned Morse codes, how to operate 
Abwehr radios, and received classes on parachuting and identification of British airplanes. 
Schmidt and Björnson practiced their cover stories as Danish refugees running from the Nazi 
occupation of their home and gathered their radios, 400 £, and documents.92 Their drop failed as 
Björnson injured his leg and could not walk on it. The Abwehr was worried that the two spies 
were compromised and decided to send Snow (Arthur Owens), whom the Germans codenamed 
Johnny, to help the two spies. What the Abwehr did not realize was that Johnny also had another 
name, Agent Snow. Snow and Schmidt left Björnson, who was eventually caught and interned 
by the British. Peculiarly, Snow kept Schmidt a secret, and he remained one of the most valued 
spies throughout the war. This loyalty was not common and because Snow was in British hands, 
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every Abwehr agent that entered Britain was identified by MI-5. Canaris’ inability to control 
Snow and realize his treachery doomed the Abwehr agents from the onset.  
 The end of the Abwehr came in 1944 when it was dissolved into the RSHA, the 
Reichssicherheitshauptamt, whose duty was to defend Germany from all enemies, foreign and 
domestic. The Abwehr needed organizational leadership and managerial efficiency to succeed in 
its role of defending the Reich. Canaris needed to battle other organizations to fill his ranks with 
the brightest men and women, not purposefully hire anti-Nazis to advance his own agenda. The 
Abwehr overlapped targets, failed to organize the Asts in a geographical manner, and did not 
improve ciphers or limit radio transmission to protect its agents.  Canaris did not care to ensure 
his agents were not compromised. Canaris failed in all of these areas and allowed the Abwehr to 
be overrun by the SS intelligence branch that continually tried to prove Canaris’ unfaithfulness to 
the Hitler. Thankfully, Canaris did all of these things, and he inevitably saved the lives of many 
with his courage.93  
 Canaris and the Abwehr did many things for the British. Canaris constantly fed 
information to the Allies, including Operation Sealion and the planned invasion of Switzerland. 
He also set up the Abwehr with a centralized structure to efficiently keep his cover as an anti-
Nazi and slowly undermine Hitler’s regime. Abwehr agents were given a large amount of 
freedom in mission planning and execution, which led to failure. The British did work well in 
their campaign against the Abwehr, but the state of the organization and its leader led to the 
Abwehr not attaining its full potential. Without Canaris, the Abwehr that fought the British may 
have been much more effective. With the foundations and breakthroughs of the prewar era and 
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coupled with the problems with the Abwehr, it is clear that MI-5 was not fighting an enemy fully 
invested in the Nazi cause.  
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Death by Hanging:  The Fall of Canaris and the Black Orchestra 
"The blood of martyrs might once again be demanded, but this blood, if we really have the 
courage and loyalty to shed it, will not be innocent, shining like that of the first witnesses for the 
faith. On our blood lies heavy guilt, the guilt of the unprofitable servant who is cast into outer 
darkness.”94 
-Sermon of anti-Nazi Pastor Dietrich Bonheoffer 
 
 
Figure 4 95 
 Canaris and his well-placed chiefs of the Abwehr fought in many instances, covertly, 
against the Nazis. The unraveling of the Abwehr started in 1943, and concluded in the early 
months of 1944, when Canaris was ousted from his position as Hitler’s spymaster. Canaris’ 
unraveling was due to multiple complications that led his enemies to exploit the waning 
confidence Hitler had in Canaris. The final event that led to the execution of Canaris was the July 
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20, 1944 plot that failed to assassinate Hitler. The events foreshadowing the fall of Canaris and 
the failed July 20 plot add to the notion of German failure in the context of the success of Double 
Cross. Because Canaris actively undermined the Nazis and with his attention and resources 
elsewhere, the British were able to easily route the Abwehr.  
 The Allied landings in North Africa were used to prove Canaris’ incompetence and 
fueled the belief that he may be a traitor. The Abwehr suffered during the Allied landings in 
Operation Torch. Abwehr officers could not predict the Allied assault and a few officers were 
captured during the landings and provided the British with information. This was significant 
because the British now had information on every important Abwehr operation until its 
dismantling.96 With North Africa lost, due to the incompetence of the Abwehr stations not 
providing accurate warning of an impeding invasion, many believed Canaris was through. As 
Stalingrad was lost and North Africa was soon to be in Allied hands, Canaris warned Hitler that 
the German were in no place to handle a mainland invasion by the Allies. Showing his lack of 
confidence in Canaris, he grabbed him by his service coat and yelled, “Are you trying to tell me 
that I am going to lose this war?”97 Canaris was immediately escorted from the room. Hitler’s 
patience for Canaris’ disregard for fanaticism was exhausted, and with the events that followed, 
Canaris fell from Hitler’s good graces. 
 The defection of an Abwehr couple to the British added to Canaris’ woes. The 
Vermehrens operated in Turkey before their disappearance. Although they were not trained 
Abwehr agents, they had knowledge of the structure and procedures of the Abwehr. In addition 
to their defection, they took an Abwehr agent, codenamed Hamburger, and another couple, the 
Kleczkowskis, with them. The SS intelligence branch, which was now investigating the Abwehr, 
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called in twelve embassy staff and three Abwehr agents in connection with the defection, and 
barred all Abwehr activities from continuing in Turkey until the matter was resolved.98 Hitler 
was given the report on the events in Turkey that fingered the potential source of infidelity as 
Canaris. This opened Canaris and the Abwehr up to scrutiny by their SS competitors, the very 
men who had been suspicious of Canaris from the outbreak of the war.  
 The next major blow to Canaris’ popularity was the uncovering of a German spy ring in 
Argentina, which cut diplomatic ties with Germany, and forced Hitler to question Canaris’ 
ability to conduct covert operations in neutral countries. By this time, Italy had defected from the 
Axis powers, and the British were using Spanish ports as shipping locations. The Abwehr Two 
section was constantly sabotaging British and Italian ships, which mangled ties between Franco 
and Hitler. Madrid’s German Ambassador, Herr Dieckhoff, brother-in-law of Ribbentrop (the 
man who was trying to oust Canaris) stated, 
“All Abwehr posts should be removed from the service buildings of embassies and 
consulates, as soon as possible, so that in a given case we can give the assurances with 
some credibility that we have no knowledge of Abwehr activities . . . everything must be 
done to ensure that in future the remaining Abwehr staff receive only operations that are 
outwardly defensive.”99 
Dieckhoff got even more than he wanted when Himmler issued orders that all sabotage in Axis 
and neutral countries were ending, and that the Abwehr was slowly going to be dismantled.100 
Ribbentrop wanted to eliminate Canaris out of suspicion that Canaris was unfaithful to the Nazi 
cause. With the instructions from Himmler, he finally had an opportunity.  
                                                        
98
 Muller, Canaris, 237. Retrieved from German archives: Letter, von Papen, Ankara, 22 February 1944, 
Re: Cabled Instr.no 216, 9 February 1944, PA/AA, R 101883, folios 311749-311751. 
99
 Ibid., 238. 
100
 Ibid. Taken from Letter, Ribbentrop, 2 February 1944, PA/AA, R 27815, folio 359219. 
 53
 Canaris’ enemies sealed his fate by pointing to the incompetence of the Abwehr. The 
Torch Landings in North Africa were botched, the defection of Abwehr operatives in Turkey 
were blamed on Canaris, and the Spanish affair showed the unpopularity of Canaris in the 
echelons of the high ranking officers of the Reich. Hitler’s patience for failure was gone. He 
removed Canaris from his position as the head of the Abwehr, ordered a unified German secret 
service to be created from the remnants of the Abwehr, and demanded that the faithful SS 
intelligence branch, headed by the Reichsführer-SS, work in compliance with the head of the 
Wehrmacht for the good of the Nazi party.101  With the July 20 plot, Canaris’ fate was sealed. 
 Canaris could have made the Abwehr into a successful organization. His intellect and 
espionage capabilities were unquestionable. These attributes, however, were inferior to his love 
of Germany. The belief that Hitler was destroying Germany led Canaris to betray his Führer. 
Canaris’ betrayal only eased the task that MI-5 had in defeating German intelligence. Without 
Canaris and his contributions against Hitler, MI-5 and the Double Cross would have battled a 
more invested opponent and their success would have been nowhere near the caliber it was.  
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Defending the Realm: MI-5 and Division B1A 
“Regnum Defende- Defend the Realm” 
-MI-5 Organizational Motto 
 
 MI-5 operatives quickly found out that no matter how ineffective the Abwehr proved to 
be because of their inner conflicts, they would need to be adequately structured and be able to 
work in tandem with their counterpart, MI-6. Where the Double Cross system succeeded was 
through its structuring. Once war broke out, MI-5 changed to new leadership. Tasked to run MI-
5, David Petrie organized each part of his mission with a specific division. This policy of 
compartmentalization was forever entrenched in MI-5. Specific to the Double Cross system, MI-
5’s counterespionage division emerged from Petrie’s lead.  
 MI-5 began the war as a small agency, comprised of military and civilian members, that 
was vastly unprepared for one double agent let alone the nearly 120 that they ran through Double 
Cross by the end of the war. But unlike the Abwehr, the agency adapted.  MI-5 personnel carried 
the added benefit of believing in a cause and trusting their fellow workers. MI-5 divisions were 
“a team of congenial people who worked together harmoniously and unselfishly, and among 
whom rank counted for little and character counted for much.”102  
 MI-5 and MI-6 shared overlapping areas of influences within missions. MI-5 gathered the 
information that MI-6 needed and vice versa. At the beginning of the war these two 
organizations struggled to find harmony. MI-5 dealt with any threats to the homeland and MI-6 
had jurisdiction outside of three miles from the British coastline. It was not until 1941 that these 
two organizations needed to be aware of everything the other was doing, to avoid compromising 
MI-5’s double agents and MI-6’s agents. In July 1940, a section of MI-5 called W Branch, the 
predecessor to B division, was established to coordinate the dissemination of false information to 
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the enemy.103  The W Board consisted of high-level officers drawn from other parts of the 
agency that could not focus on the day-to-day tasking of counterespionage. To control 
counterespionage, B1a Division was created. This division reported to a subcommittee of the W 
Board, the Twenty Committee (also denoted XX). The Double Cross system derives its name 
from the XX in the Twenty Committee’s title.  
 The W board spent the early years of the war exercising its centralized control in a way 
the Canaris did with the Abwehr. The W board personally authorized Snow to travel to Lisbon in 
1941, and for Celery to travel there for a second time. In September 1941, it authorized sabotage 
to be carried out. By December of 1941, it mandated that all misinformation to the enemy would 
be provided by the W board and it decided who would be considered for double agency. But as 
the Twenty Committee continually produced successful operations, the W board left more and 
more authority to Masterman and his cohorts to discern what would be acceptable for the double 
agents to do and the misinformation they could send.104 
The important men of the Double Cross system were Liddell, White, Robertson, and 
Masterman. Guy Liddell was the director of counterespionage, head of B division. Dick White 
was Liddell’s deputy head of B1a division. Thomas “Tar” Robertson was the head of B1a and 
tasked with the direct oversight of the Double Cross system and its agents. John Masterman was 
the chairman of the Twenty Committee. As the Twenty Committee received more power of the 
implementation of the Double Cross system, MI-5 began to live up to Masterman’s claim of 
completely running the German espionage system within England.  
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The Twenty Committee met every week from January of 1941 to May of 1945, holding 
226 meetings.105  It retained a strict hold over every double agent operation. This oversight led to 
meticulous planning and careful orchestration of all the double agents operating within the 
Double Cross system. The Twenty Committee served as the final authority on all matters of 
misinformation that was passed to the Germans, but it also served as a liaison to other agencies. 
MI-6 and other departmental intelligence agencies sent liaison officers to ensure that the double 
agents and their own personnel would work together to prevent either from being compromised. 
The central planning of the Twenty Committee eliminated interservice rivalry by sharing 
information with the other intelligence agencies. This cooperation allowed the Twenty 
Committee to track the knowledge of British intelligence officials outside of the Double Cross 
system to limit the possibility of harming the secrecy that Double Cross needed to run 
effectively. An excerpt from Liddell’s diary on January 23, 1941 details the kind of 
misinformation that the Twenty Committee tried to send Germany:  
“I attended a meeting of the Twenty Committee today when various schemes  
 were discussed. We are to go ahead with Plan I, which is a scheme for getting the  
 Germans to bomb a wood on the assumption that it is full of ammunition. We  
 also discussed Stringer’s plan for telling the Germans that all our troops are going 
 to have some special identification mark in the event of invasion. The idea is that  
the Germans should use this identification made and that we should not. This is    
known as the Blue Boot Plan as Stringer’s suggestion by way of illustrating his  
meaning had been to tell the Germans that all our troops would have their right  
boot painted blue and that our troops should be issued with tins of blue paint to  
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add conviction to the story.”106 
Plans like the Blue Boot Plan were discussed regularly at meetings in an attempt to share the 
information with the necessary sources and decide what exactly would be sent to the Germans by 
way of Double Agents. By discussing these plans in one central location, every agency would be 
informed at the same level to avert any mistakes made by not having all of the pertinent 
information.  Unlike Abwehr practices, MI-5’s ability to trust in a standardized system that gave 
power to smaller groups that could focus on a particular mission. Thus, the system made the 
Double Cross successful.  
 The Twenty Committee’s ability to break down into subcommittees also provided 
stability in the execution of Double Cross. Masterman explains,  
“ For example, when the time came to discuss getting rid of some of the agents, an 
‘Execution Subcommittee’ was appointed by the Twenty Committee which dealt with 
this particular subject. What the execution committee in fact did was to discuss carefully 
with the head of B1a the cases of half a dozen agents . . . an agreed list was then 
produced . . . and since everyone was working for the same ends, no one troubled to 
decide the academic point whether MI-5 or MI-6 could get rid of one or more agents 
without the approval of the Committee or of the W Board.”107  
These subcommittees had the confidence of the director of B1a and the W Board, which allowed 
decisions to be made at a smaller level and increased efficiency and timeliness of decisions.  
 The Twenty Committee worked closely with B1a division to construct an effective 
system of espionage. Robertson was the head of B1a division and one of the most capable 
officers MI-5 produced during the war.  He was adept at picking handlers for his agents. 
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Surprisingly, many of these handlers had no previous experience in espionage or 
counterespionage.108 Robertson’s control over the B1a division yielded good results. Operation 
Sealion forced the Abwehr to insert enemy agents in haste with faulty ID cards and travel papers. 
With the help of the B1b division, in charge of reading and organizing Abwehr intercepts, 
Robertson and B1a were able to capture all 25 agents and turn four of them into double agents.  
With tongue in cheek, Robertson claimed that he was in charge of the Abwehr and not Admiral 
Canaris. In July 1942, Robertson sent a memo to the Twenty Committee revealing “the only 
network of agents possessed by the Germans in this country is that which is now under the 
control of the Security Service . . . The combined General Staff in this country have, in MI-5 
double agents, a powerful means of exercising influence over the OKW.”109 It is because of the 
compartmentalization and the oversight that Robertson received that the Double Cross system 
had so much success.  
 The Double Cross system was kept secret from the public and other British agencies to 
ensure its continued success in the war. Even Prime Minister Winston Churchill had little 
information on the covert war that raged within his homeland. In 1943, Liddell decided to that 
the system was stable enough to let Churchill in one the basic operations of the Double Cross 
system. After all, Churchill had received word years before from Canaris of the potential 
invasion of England in Operation Sealion and had earned the right to at least know what Double 
Cross accomplished on a basic level. A memo sent to him stating, “In all 126 spies have fallen 
into our hands. Of these, twenty-four have been found amenable and are now being used as 
Double Cross agents. In addition twelve real, and seven imaginary persons have been foisted 
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upon the enemy as Double Cross spies. Thirteen spies have been executed.”110 In simple terms, 
Double Cross acted as a filter. The system separated the defective from the seriously defective 
and used agents that were somewhat controllable. The thirteen spies that were executed were 
deemed too dangerous to be kept living. They were fanatics that became double agents because 
they truly believed in the Nazi cause over their own personal benefits. MI-5 used these radicals 
as an example to all other captured spies. When incarcerated in the wartime camps, rumors of the 
ill-fated extremists spread among the recently captured and proved that in wartime, MI-5 could 
be as ruthless as they wanted. The remaining ninety spies that were not executed and did not turn 
for the enemy were kept for the duration of the war in prison camps, forced out of honor to not 
betray their allegiance but also kept by fear from adhering to fanaticism that only proved to place 
someone at the end of a rope. Many of them provided bits of information that were somewhat 
useful and showed that they were worthy of not being executed. The Double Cross system 
filtered the opportunists from the spies and fanatics.  
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THE ALLIED LIARS 
 The preceding sections have explained external factors that set Double Cross up for 
success. The final contributions to the success of Double Cross arose from the structure of the 
system that successfully deceived the Nazis. The carefully placed pieces Robertson used to 
create the Double Cross pipeline and the initial turning of the agents at Camp 020, led the agents 
to operate in a system that was conducive to deception, culminating in the grand deception of 
Hitler during Operation Overlord. Double Cross used these small aforementioned parts, of equal 
importance, to combat the Germans in the war of deception that ran parallel to the famous battles 
of World War II. These small parts of the system must be credited for the success of Double 
Cross and not the current, popular narrative that places success in the hands of Double Cross’ 
creators and agents. 
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Double Cross: The Structure 
“The Double Agent System was like an orchestra, with ‘first violins’ playing the main theme, 
‘second violins’ supporting them, and the conductor – in this case, J.C. Masterman, head of the 
XX Committee – blending the dissonant chords of sabotage, political disinformation, rumors and 
physical deception into a single symphony that was then broadcast to the Germans.”111 
 
  
 The Double Cross system was predicated on the belief that enemy spies valued their lives 
more than their master’s ideology. This assumption proved to be correct.  MI-5 possessed the 
power to lie to Hitler and control the movements of its enemies. The power came in the form 
double agents. The use of traitors to advance a cause is ancient. Sun Tzu proclaimed, “ It is 
essential to seek out enemy agents who have come to conduct espionage against you and bribe 
them to serve you. Give the, instructions and care for them. Thus double agents are recruited and 
used.”112 The double agents proved helpful to the Allied cause, but it was the structure that 
remained paramount to their effectiveness. 
 The structure of Double Cross formed around the simple truth that liars lie and traitors 
betray. The majority of spies were bound to their own self-preservation rather than an intangible 
ideology. This was the case for the Double Cross system. Spies were used to obtain a singular 
objective or became long-term operatives. This allowed MI-5 to use their spies for strategic 
operations that inflicted the most damage upon the enemy. To commit long-term deception, a 
system was needed to control and document the flow of information, and misinformation. The 
structure allowed for the accomplishment of multiple tasks. These included the control any 
German agents operating in England, manipulation of compromised agents, recruitment of new 
spies, collection of data on the enemy’s weaknesses and intentions, but above all, deception.  
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 While the Twenty Committee decided what information could be sent out to enemy 
agents, it also shielded Double Cross from the bureaucracy within MI-5. Double Cross also had 
the support of an entire division, B1a, devoted to its every need. B1a supplied an agent with a 
case officer, wireless operators to receive an agent’s messages, two guards to follow him, and 
cover identification that allowed him to freely operate as a double agent without arousing 
suspicion.113 This division had the benefit of secrecy, something that if ruined, would expose the 
delicate operation of Double Cross.  
 Masterman used the first meeting of the Twenty Committee to outline the importance of 
the Double Cross system. The double agent system, argues Masterman, “enables us to gain 
insight into the personnel, methods, and means of communication of the German espionage 
organization within this country.” By building the system, it was clear that MI-5 had the ability 
to control enemy espionage. Masterman argued that the double agent system was a source of 
numerous German cyphers that can easily be broken and used against the enemy in any future 
campaigns. He also noted that the questionnaires supplied by the Abwehr let MI-5 know what 
the Nazis were planning to attack within England. Masterman alluded to the prospect of the 
culmination of Double Cross ends in a final, large deception of the enemy. To accomplish this, 
double agents must be turned and given hierarchical importance based on how they communicate 
with the enemy.  
 Masterman outlined twelve cardinal rules that Double Cross must adhere to ensure 
success.  These were 1) no information was to be sent to the enemy without a final approving 
authority, in this case the Twenty Committee. As noted before, the Committee’s function was to 
keep MI-5 and its fellow organizations up-to-date on ongoing operations to preserve the cover of 
its agents; 2) double agent cases, if proven to promising, can be used but they should never be 
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created. An opportunity should be exploited and not created. Agents should also be controlled 
centrally to avoid a focus of resources on one agent; 3) a double agent should live the life he or 
she would have as an enemy agent. Agents should have actually experienced what they claim to 
have done. A lie will only be believed if it has some trace of truth; 4) a case officer must be 
assigned to every double agent that knew the day-to-day workings of his agents operations; 5) 
perform a careful psychological examination of each agent. This provides some predictability of 
an agent in their rather unpredictable line of work. A psychological examination also provides 
information on the best way to turn an agent into a double agent; 6) financial incentives are 
necessary to prevent a double agent from becoming a triple agent; 7) decisiveness is crucial 
when operating double agents to prevent suspicion on behalf of the enemy that he may have been 
compromised. A long time between transmissions from an agent to a handler signals potential for 
an agent to be compromised; 8) spies are caught through patience and the study of tangible 
records; 9) agents must be kept separate from each other in most cases. Snow and Celery proved 
this corollary when Snow, out of jealousy, compromised the cover of Celery; 10) there is no 
standard amount of risk an agent should take. Each agent is unique and can only operate 
successfully within specific amounts of risk; 11) Recruitment of double agents follows the rule 
of quality over quantity; 12) imaginary agents are preferable to real agents because MI-5 officers 
were able to directly transmit to the Abwehr. The Double Cross system proved to be successful 
because of these rules.114 
 Tar Robertson, whose sole job was to run the Double Cross system, controlled the B1a 
division. Below Robertson were the case officers of the agents.  Robertson’s most important rule 
was to pick case officers who could delve as deeply into the deception as the agents. Over the 
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course of the war there were an average of five case officers at any time who were charged with 
the agents and their needs. These officers ran the payments, housing, maintenance, and guarding 
of an agent.115 The case officers were so invested within their agents’ case that the Twenty 
Committee relied on them to suggest the best methods to continue their deception and extract 
every ounce of potential each agent had. They were the ones who knew if an agent had reached 
the maximum level of use to MI-5. Case officers, as opposed to agents, had to be aware of what 
the other was doing. Each day, Dick White, the deputy director of B division under Guy Liddell, 
organized a meeting of Division B1a case officers to insure no overlapping operations could 
compromise the agents.116  
With the case officers adequately organized, the agents also required transmission 
specialists. The wireless transmitting officers were the next important piece in the structure of 
Double Cross.  The wireless officer was the technical specialist who ensured the approved 
information that was sent to the Germans was done so in the correct code. With a small misstep 
by the wireless transmitters, the Double Cross system could easily have been lost. The wireless 
officer was strictly concerned with transmissions. The information coming back from the 
Abwehr was transmitted to an additional two officers who organized it and submitted it to the 
Twenty Committee. Another officer was in charge of organizing and creating a reference for all 
information coming from the Abwehr to the Double Cross agents. This allowed any new reports 
from other sources of information to help ascertain the validity of the information gathered 
through Double Cross. The organization of all transmission to and from an agent to their Abwehr 
handlers helped maintain consistency in their cover and explained why so many agents were able 
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to secure their cover over a span of years rather than months. In addition to the wireless operator 
and case agent, the double agent required more administrative support. 
 The agents lived two lives. Their true life was the one they were living as an exposed, 
and turned, spy. Their false life was the life that their initial enlisters believed they were living. 
For instance, the German handlers believed their spies to have civilian jobs and were blended in 
with society. MI-5 would create records transferring them to areas of England that would 
correspond with the information they fed to their German handlers. By solidifying a paper trail, 
the agents could feel comfortable with telling their notional story that had tangible evidence they 
were telling the truth. Masterman states, “If, for example, our agent was told by his German 
masters to inspect and report on factories in Wolverhampton, we arranged, if it was possible, that 
he should visit the place himself before he replied.”117 To aid the spy in delineating between the 
two, the Double Cross system had to employ a rigid structure and an abundance of documented 
information to ensure that each spy could refer back to their previous actions. MI-5 also had to 
set the spy up with a life within England in a way that would not arouse suspicion as to the 
nature of his work. MI-5 employed security agents who constantly watched the double agents. 
They were given drivers in case of emergency and housekeepers to look after their true lives so 
that they could focus on their false ones.  
 The agents and handlers were supplied with clear instructions on what each was to do. 
The auxiliary personnel tapped to aid the agents administratively were also instructed on the 
scope of their jobs. All of these pieces operated in a clear, synchronized fashion, as well as in 
secret.  The result was an extraordinary result: the deception of Hitler by the turning of a double 
agent.  
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The Monocle Man: The Art of Breaking A Human 
"The high-souled fanatic may repudiate even the suggestion that he would be capable of giving way to 
pressure and of acting as a double agent, but the majority of spies are not of this Spartan breed."118 
-John Masterman 
Figure 5 119 
 
 The turning of a double agent began with the initial interrogation. MI-5 found how useful the spy 
could be and what method would be best to insure his or her cooperation. Whether it was due to fear, 
money, or the instinct to survive, Colonel ‘Tin Eye’ Stephens broke the spies down and insured they 
become traitors. His interrogation techniques and camps occupy a small section in the current scholarship 
on Double Cross; he is portrayed as playing only a tiny part  in the process of turning a spy into a double 
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agent. Stephens’ contributions were much more substantial, however. All agents went to him, and if he 
made a mistake, Double Cross would be doomed to failure. Stephens was as important to Double Cross as 
its foundations and structures. 
 Camp 020, located in West London, was the interrogation center used to turn the majority of 
double agents in World War II. Stephens also ran operations at the London Cage, part of the Kensington 
Palace Gardens. These interrogation camps used unique methods, including torture, to get the double 
agents to turn. The British fervently deny the use of torture at any of their interrogation camps, but in the 
last two decades, stories have surfaced about the wretched conditions inmates faced at the camps. 
Whether moral or not, Stephens used every method to add agents to Double Cross. Stephens’ greatest 
weapon was the ability to judge a spy’s character in regard to his prejudices of Europeans. Stephens 
disliked most of Europe and claimed that “Italians were undersized, ‘posturing folks’, and Belgians 
overweight, ‘weeping and romantic’, the French corrupt, Polish Jews ‘shifty’, and Icelanders were 
‘unintelligent’.”120 These preconceptions led Stephens to hold no empathy for his captives and cemented 
his belief that “the interrogator must treat each spy as a very individual case . . . a very personal 
enemy.”121 Stephens also proclaimed that “there must be certain inherent qualities: an implacable hatred 
of the enemy, a certain ingressive approach, a disinclination to believe, and above all a relentless 
determination to break down the spy, however hopeless the odds, however many the difficulties, however 
long the process may take.”122 The cold demeanor guided him to produce double agents.  
 When the spies were dropped off at Camp 020, they were immediately pressed through 
interrogations. Stephens used the initial evaluation and interrogation to determine whether the spy would 
potentially betray Germany. The spies who were deemed unable to be turned were either detained for the 
remainder of the war or executed. Stephens then offered the suitable spies the opportunity to become 
double agents against Germany or face death. “You have forfeited your life, but there is a way of saving 
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your life,” he told them.123  Whether out of fear, self-preservation, or both, some of the agents took the 
offer to commit treachery. Out of the 25 spies in England in 1940, four became Double Cross agents. Two 
of those agents, Wulf Schmidt (codenamed Tate) and Gösta Caroli (codenamed Summer), initiated the 
Double Cross system.  
 The Abwehr trained the two Scandinavians, captured two weeks apart, together in Hamburg. 
Summer suffered a concussion on impact after parachuting out of a plane over the Northampton 
Countryside because of his inability to follow directions and place his gear in a separate parachute to 
avoid being too heavy during his static line jump.124 He was found the next day carrying a radio, pistol, 
and large denominations of English pounds. Stephens realized that Summer was a fanatical Nazi and 
instead of coercing him through fear or death, neither of which would have yielded results, he offered the 
life of his comrade Tate in exchange for Summer’s promise to be a double agent. Stephens’ genius led 
him to exploit the bond of friendship between Summer and Tate. His ability to recognize each spy as an 
individual led to the initial success in Summer case. Summer, however, became erratic and after trying to 
kill his MI-5 security detail and attempting to escape, was imprisoned for the rest of the war. Despite this 
setback, Stephens’ ability to turn agents became a reliable foundation of Double Cross.  
 Tate proved to be a bigger challenge to Stephens than Summer. After being detained, Tate stuck 
to his story of being a refugee. Stephens prodded Tate with repeated questions, and inevitably caught him 
in a lie. He then notified Tate that his friend Summer had compromised him. Stephens smartly left out the 
part that explained Summer sought to protect Tate. Feeling betrayed, Tate divulged everything to 
Stephens who then blamed Tate’s situation on the inability of the Abwehr to properly train their field 
agents. The very next day Liddell was informed that Tate had agreed to work with MI-5.125 Tate had 
notified Stephens of his network, mission, Abwehr contacts, transmission codes, and the spies who were 
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to enter Britain in the coming months.126 Stephens had correctly manipulated Tate into working as a 
double agent, the longest lasting one of the war.  
 Stephens also turned Eddie, codenamed Agent Zigzag. Stephens preferred to raise tension in the 
interrogation room, demanding “no gossip. No cigarettes . . . a spy in war should be at the point of a 
bayonet. It is a question of atmosphere. The room is like a court and he is made to stand up and answer 
questions as before a judge.”127 For Zigzag, the atmosphere was more than enough to force a full 
confession. Chapman divulged everything to Stephens – from his early life, his incarceration in a Jersey 
prison, the Abwehr recruitment and training he received in Nantes and Berlin, his method of infiltration 
into England including the type of plane, its maneuvering, the strict instructions, and even the pilots 
names. Zigzag offered the codes he knew, his sabotage techniques and targets, how to communicate in 
code, and the wireless frequencies. He went further and offered the description of his contacts in the 
Abwehr and the names of all the agents that he knew were operating in England.  
Stephens: Now will you tell me when you were first contacted by the German Secret    
                Service? 
Zigzag: It was definitely in January. There was an Oberleutnant Thomas. He asked me –  
             he said that he was very interested in me and would I be prepared to work for the  
             Germans. 
Stephens: yes. Well now, as quickly as you can you give me the gist of that? 
Zigzag: He said the German authorities had accepted my offer, my proposal and was I  
prepared to be trained by the German Secret Service, in sabotage and such like  
and to learn Radio Telegraphy. The whole thing came out and I said I was quite  
prepared to carry it out and what about my friend Farmius and he said that  
unfortunately they could not accept his offer. Then there was a sort of half-threat,  
meaning that in times of war we must be careful and one of you must stay here so  
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that was all there was to be said.  
Stephens: Did he go into detail now – did he say that – what did he offer you? 
Zigzag: He told me that first of all I would be taken out of the camp. They just wanted me  
to train. I was taken to Paris in a separate compartment and then I was taken to Nantes.128  
 
There was not a single stone left unturned by Stephens. Even with Zigzag’s honesty, Stephens 
still decided to dismantle his psyche. Stephens used the trick of turning the suspect against their German 
handlers and blaming the lack of preparation by the Abwehr for the present situation. 
 Stephens: Your cash was wrapped in German bands. It would have cost you your  
neck if spotted. The man, who was supposed to search you, proceeds to       
identify your currency with a German label? 
Zigzag: That’s the fault of Thomas; in excitement he probable forgot to take it  
 off.129 
Stephens disassociated Chapman from his Abwehr handlers and once there was enough space, Stephens 
left the room and sent in someone with a more cheery attitude. It was his way of rewarding Chapman for 
his honesty. Chapman had just given MI-5 the entire Abwehr operation in France, its training network, 
and key ways to identify other enemy agents in England. This was due to Stephens ability to not rush, to 
judge character, and to ask the right questions. Stephens also allowed Chapman to begin transmitting right 
away with his German counterparts to throw off suspicion that Chapman was compromised. Without 
Stephens’ ability to quickly extract information and the Double Cross systems efficient organization, this 
decision would have taken too long, potentially exposing Chapman and losing Britain its longest serving 
double agent.  
 Stephens was able to produce double agents who were unusually loyal to MI-5. It was a unique 
skill he possessed that allowed him to stabilize the Double Cross system’s conversion of agents. The 
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system worked better because of the initial ground work done by Stephens. This loyalty was because of 
his ability to turn individual spies and not apply a single technique, say fear, to turn all enemy agents. 
Without Stephens’ contributions to Double Cross, the system’s agents may have not been as loyal. 
Without the strong foundation Stephens built for MI-5 in interrogations, the double agents may have 
lacked the conviction they possessed for the Allied cause. Recognizing each weakness and exploiting it 
with a ruthless attitude, Stephens supplied Double Cross with not only adequate spies, but also priceless 
and organized information on the Abwehr.  
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Two-Faced: The Agents of Double Cross and their Successes 
“This weapon – unique in its power and unlimited in its range – was quite different from any built before 
or since. It was so shrouded in secrecy that its inventors were, for some time, unaware that they possessed 
it an unsure how to use it. This weapon did not kill or main. It did not rely on science, engineering, or 
force. It did no destroy cities, sink U-boats, or pierce the armor of panzers. It did something far more 
subtle. Instead of killing the enemy, it could make the Nazis think what the British wanted them to think, 
and therefore do what the British wanted them to do. The British Security Service had built a weapon that 
could lie to Hitler.”130 
- Ben Macintyre 
 
 Although all of the variables were critical to the success of double-cross, agents were still needed 
to do their jobs. The exploits of agents like Johann Jebsen, Dusan Popov, Wulf Schmidt, Edward 
Chapman, Renato Levi, and Juan Garcia show that when given the right structure to operate in, success 
was assured.  Thus, the system merged with the mythology, joining my argument with the traditional 
historiography of intelligence and the double-cross process. 
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               Johann Jebsen                        Dusan Popov 
       MI-5 Codename: Artist        MI-5 Codename: Tricycle  
Figure 6               Figure 7 131  
 
One night in 1936, Johann “Johnny” Jebsen raced his supercharged Mercedes 540K 
convertible through the streets of Freiburg alongside his friend’s BMW. Dusan Popov and Jebsen 
attend university together and their friendship revolved around material pursuits. As an orphaned 
heir to a shipping empire and student studying economics at the University of Freiburg, Jebsen 
built a reputation as a playboy through an “excesses of money, cars, parties, and women.” Popov, 
                                                        
131
 KV 2/845-847, Intelligence File on Dusan Popov and Johann Jebsen provided the photograph of 
Jebsen. Popov’s photograph was taken from the photograph section in Macintyre, Double Cross but was 
originally from a private collection.  
 74
a law student, had the same reputation as Jebsen. The two spent their university days living 
extravagantly instead of studying. After college the two inevitably parted ways, but their 
friendship from the university days became one of the most profound bonds in the Double Cross 
system of World War II.132  
Jebsen was calculated, intelligent, and knew how to win the affection of just about 
anyone. Ironically in the years leading to the Second World War, he felt a stranger amidst the 
pro-Nazi propaganda streaming through Germany. It appeared as if Jebsen would follow in the 
privileged and guided footsteps of any wealthy heir predestined for success. However!!, instead 
of following an easy path he became a dedicated double agent who resisted the temptation of 
Nazi torture in order to save his friend from his college days, Popov, and the work that he did for 
the Double Cross system. At the start of the war, Jebsen joined the Abwehr but secretly gave his 
loyalties to MI-5. Jebsen, codenamed “Artist” by British intelligence, was an important spy for 
MI-5 and was an incomparable cog in the methodical Double Cross system.  
Jebsen eventually recruited Popov, and after realizing that both would rather uphold the 
Allied cause versus the Axis one, they began a calculated campaign to undermine the Nazis from 
within. Jebsen and Popov were playboys who were easily influenced by their vices:  women, 
cars, and parties. They are not the typical spies, yet they did so much for MI-5. Without the 
structure that Double Cross provided, Jebsen and Popov would not have been able to inflict as 
much damage to the Abwehr. Because the system was organized and took care of its agents by 
making their deceptions conceivable to the Germans, men like Jebsen and Popov were able to 
leave a lasting mark on history.  
Jebsen recruited Popov in an odd manner. In 1940, Jebsen informed Popov that he had 
joined the Abwehr to escape being a soldier in World War II for the Nazis. Jebsen then set a 
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meeting with a senior Abwehr official who asked Popov to join the Abwehr to help facilitate the 
Nazi invasion in Operation Sealion. Popov, in his time apart from Jebsen, created a large law 
firm in Serbia that would allow Popov to move freely about Europe without arousing suspicion. 
The official boasted to Popov, “we [the Abwehr] have many agents in England, quite a number 
of them excellent. But your connections would open many doors. You could render us a great 
service. And we could do the same for you. The Reich knows how to show its appreciation.”133 
Popov accepted the offer and covertly notified the British secretary at the embassy in Belgrade 
that an Abwehr officer tried to recruit him. The secretary immediately notified MI-6 and told the 
Popov to continue the relationship. Days later, Jebsen informed Popov that he would travel to 
England through Portugal and pose as a businessmen exporting raw materials.134 Popov would 
take notes on whatever the Abwehr deemed important and then communicate his findings back 
to the Abwehr station in Portugal. The questionnaire he was given by Jebsen was immediately 
turned over to MI-5. The structure that the system imposed forced the questionnaire to the 
Twenty Committee who decided what information could be sent back by Popov. It was at this 
moment when Popov became “Agent Tricycle”. 
 Tricycle’s major contribution to the allied cause was in proving that the Germans could 
be made to believe what the men of Double Cross wanted them to. Tricycle was sent to America 
to set up a system comparable to Double Cross with the aid of the FBI. Unfortunately he was not 
treated as well as he was accustomed to because the FBI kept him at a distance.    
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover believed he was merely a criminal, and although the FBI rounded 
up thirty-three German spies with the help of Tricycle, the importance of double agents was lost 
on the Americans. Hoover believed that the round up proved that a spy was only good to catch 
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other spies.135 Popov was being underutilized even though he provided his German questionnaire 
that had tasked him to research the American’s atomic energy, military preparations, convoys, 
industrial production, politics, and civilian morale.136 Popov, under the direction of the FBI, sent 
letters back to his handlers, but to no avail. Unlike MI-5, which realized the potential in 
providing misinformation and  required some actual, unimportant intelligence to be sent to the 
enemies, the FBI refused to give any worthwhile information for Tricycle to pass on to his 
handlers. Tricycle’s inability to provide actionable intelligence led to a loss of faith by his 
German handlers. In 1942, a message was intercepted by the code breakers at Bletchley 
indicating “Berlin suspected Popov of working both sides and recommended extreme caution in 
dealing with him.”137  
 Tricycle had to convince the Germans that he was still valuable. With the lack of FBI 
cooperation, he created information that he received from people to whom he never had spoken. 
The lie was thin, but with Tricycle’s knack for deception, it was possible to convince the 
Germans that head not been compromised by MI-5. Tricycle met his handler in Portugal in 1942 
and his story was not questioned. The Abwehr officers were eager to believe everything Tricycle 
said, to the astonishment of MI-5. Robertson was sure that Tricycle’s cover was blown and 
believed that it could unravel the entire network if Tricycle was interrogated. Despite the lack of 
interrogation, Tricycle’s case officer reported back to Berlin that after “intense interrogation”, 
Popov was uncompromised and still could be used as a spy.138 Tricycle was free of suspicion and 
unearthed the fact that the Abwehr were not as unified as MI-5 believed. Tricycle was tasked 
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with acquiring as much information as possible about the Allied invasion plan. It was in 1942 
that Robertson realized the most important use for Double Cross: to make the Germans think 
what MI-5 wanted. Without MI-5’s faith in its agents and the Abwehr embezzlement, Double 
Cross would not have realized the ability to influence German thinking. It was in part due to the 
personality of Tricycle, but the majority of the realization was because of Abwehr failures.  
 Jebsen, codenamed Artist, routinely helped the Allied cause. He aided Tricycle’s network 
and helped orchestrate the Garbo network. He was an invaluable link in Double Cross because he 
was an agent and also a recruiter. Artist received far more information in this unique position 
than any other German agents. Artist was captured and tortured in 1944, but the SS interrogators 
failed to extract any information. Artist kept quiet, even though he knew the most intimate 
secrets of Double Cross. With the help of the Artist and Tricycle cases, Robertson and B1a 
division discovered exactly how much power they possessed over the Abwehr through their 
campaign of misinformation. The triumphs of Artist and Tricycle would not have been possible 
without the system to adequately manage and oversee each of the unique cases. The unfaithful 
Abwehr case officers who protected themselves and their embezzling aided Double Cross 
unknowingly. If the Abwehr officers in charge of Tricycle had been faithful to their organization, 
Double Cross would have inevitably disintegrated. The agents played a key part, especially 
Artist and his ability to resist torture, but would have faltered without the external variables of 
structure and Abwehr failure aiding them. These external variables helped MI-5 discover the 
greatest asset of the Double Cross system; the ability to lead the Germans down whatever path 
the Allies wanted.  
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           John Moe                Tor Glad 
MI-5 Codename: Mutt      MI-5 Codename: Jeff 
                      Figure 8139  
 
 John Moe and Tor Glad were not unique to the Double Cross system. They, as Snow, 
Zigzag, and Tricycle before them, willingly turned themselves in to British authorities upon their 
arrival. They were both some of the more insignificant agents and their deceptions were not as 
grandiose as Garbo’s would be.  Yet they provide a perfect example of how the calculated 
structure of Double Cross and German failure laid the groundwork for success. The ability for 
the Twenty Committee to intern Glad because of unreliability and the lack of proper recruitment 
by the Abwehr were the reasons why the Mutt and Jeff case succeeded.  
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 The duo’s recruitment is shrouded in unreliable testimony from Glad. In his initial 
interrogation by Stephens, Glad declares that his German handler approached him with an offer 
to work for the Abwehr. In the second interrogation the following day, Glad said that he 
approached his future Abwehr handle and offered to become an agent.140 Either way, it was Glad 
who brought his friend and fellow Norwegian Moe into the Abwehr service. Both were hastily 
screened by the Abwehr and sent to training to become sabotage agents.141 Mutt and Jeff were 
trained in Norway and by February 1941 had completed their Morse, wireless transmission, 
incendiary and explosive mixtures, and sabotage instruction. They were sent to Britain on April 
7th with terribly made ID and ration cards and immediately gave themselves up as agents.142  
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 After the initial interrogation, Mutt was deemed employable by B1a division because it was clear that he 
held no deep sympathy for the Nazis. Jeff’s case was completely different than Mutt’s. The interrogation 
revealed that Jeff harbored sympathy for the N
Abwehr duties more than he admitted. Unlike Mutt, Jeff worked for the Abwehr before the invasion of 
Norway. Because Jeff was considered a potential danger, he was watched very closely in the initial 
of the Double Cross work.  
 Mutt and Jeff made contact with the Abwehr after they were set up in a 
The Abwehr immediately responded asking: if Mutt and Jeff were interrogated
asked; what the status of the bombardment was on the towns
the country in the coming days.144 Because the Twenty Committee oversaw the case so rigidly, there was 
ample opportunity to exploit Mutt and Jeff’s case. The Twenty Committee u
what information the Germans had on the status of their bombardments. They also decided that Mutt and 
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Jeff could be used to trap other agents that were entering England. Because of the system that the Twenty 
Committee established, Mutt and Jeff’s case fit into the larger framework of the deception campaign that 
centered on convincing the Germans where an Allied attack on Europe was imminent. The Twenty 
Committee used Mutt and Jeff to convince the Germans a landing in Norway was a real possibility. The 
structure that created and categorized the information provided the needed efficiency for success. The 
structure also was involved enough in the observation of Mutt and Jeff to deem Jeff unsuitable for 
continual service to Double Cross. B1a division eventually detained him to prevent the Double Cross 
system from being compromised. If the case were to be kept alive, a sabotage attack would have to be 
committed to preserve Mutt’s cover. The Twenty Committee then decided on a fake sabotage operation 
that Mutt would carry out. The concentrated effort by B1a division with their established structure 
allowed the Mutt and Jeff case to marginally succeed. Without the structure in place to guide Mutt into 
giving the specific information that the Committee deemed necessary, the case would have not yielded 
any results.  
 The turning of Mutt and Jeff was also telling. The fact that these two Abwehr agents immediately 
defied their German orders and alerted local police of their identities and presence revealed a trend within 
Abwehr recruitment. The problems of recruitment have been explained, but the infidelity of agents is a 
tangible manifestation of the problem. Like many other agents, these two turned themselves in because of 
a misalignment between their values and the Abwehr’s. Without these problems, it is improbable that MI-
5 would have been presented with the multitude of opportunities from 1939-1944.  
 
                           
 Tate’s enlistment in Double Cross
the career of Double Cross’ longest serving agent.
double agent and served MI-5 loyally until the end of the war. His accomplishments were only made 
possible by the structure of the Double Cross system
other agents were, to accomplish a grandiose deception. Specifically, Tate was able to keep the Germans 
interested in his help because of the information the Twenty Committee created for him to send to 
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Wulf Schmidt 
MI-5 Codename: Tate 
Figure 10145 
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Germany and the financial rouse that MI-5 helped orchestrate. Without the system to help Tate create a 
cover that could withstand scrutiny, Tate would have been compromised much sooner. The cover that 
Double Cross helped Tate form was trusted by the German forces so much that Tate was awarded the 
First and Second Class Iron Cross.  
 Tate was able to keep the Abwehr’s faith by continually needing money. The plan, put together 
through the Double Cross system’s network, denied Tate adequate funding so he continually had to plea 
to the Abwehr for payment. The constant plea for money forced the Abwehr to send one of its officers to 
hand-deliver Tate’s payment. Of course, the officer was captured as soon as he set foot onto English soil. 
Tate continued his ruse, under the direction of the Twenty Committee, and received £20,000 from the 
Abwehr for his financial troubles.147 This proved to his handlers that he was indeed trusted and in good 
standing with the Abwehr. The Double Cross network even created a fictional farm that Tate worked on 
in order to provide him with an excuse for why he was unable to recruit agents or transmit as frequently 
as he should to the Abwehr. The Committee also created situations that naturally forced Tate and high 
military and intelligence officials to meet, giving him real people he could use to predicate his lies to the 
Abwehr.148 The structure of Double Cross, in the case of Tate, is important because when he fell ill and 
could no longer transmit to the Germans, his officer was able to take over the case and transmit on his 
behalf.  
 Tate’s fictional farm work also aided in the D-Day deception campaign. Because Tate’s farm was 
located near the fictional First United States Army Group headquarters, he could report on troop 
movements and invasion timetables. The Committee routinely cleared information to be sent to Germany 
detailing the movements of the fictional Army group, which earned Tate a special amount of trust from 
his Abwehr handlers.149  
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Tate’s case was important for the Double Cross system because it was the longest active case in 
the system and it proved Double Cross’ capabilities. Tate proved that not only with careful structure and 
compartmentalization could the life of an agent be constructed and seem credible, but it also that the 
compartmentalization and rigid structure allowed for anyone to take the place if the original double agent 
was unable to continue his work. Tate could have compromised himself Tate is strong evidence that the 
structure of Double Cross was more integral to an agent’s success than the agents themselves.  
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Edward Chapman 
MI-5 Codename: Zigzag 
                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11150 
 
Zigzag’s triumphs of the war revolve around relaying misinformation to the Germans about their 
bombardment campaigns. Zigzag was able to keep his cover, much like Tate was, due to the fact that MI-
5 was able to orchestrate a successful deception. The de Havilland factory sabotage and the deception of 
the Germans regarding the V-1 rockets were successful because of the organization and not Zigzag 
himself.  
 In January 1943, Zigzag was tasked with sabotaging the Mosquito bomber at the de Havilland 
factory in Britain.151 The Mosquito planes continually proved to be a problem to the Abwehr and the 
Luftwaffe. This mission that was given to Zigzag was to ensure that not only would the air war favor the 
Luftwaffe, but to also verify that Zigzag was of value to the Abwehr. Zigzag brought the mission to the 
attention of his handler and B1a division. The Twenty Committee devised a fake sabotage operation on 
the factory to satisfy the Abwehr and coerce them into thinking that the Luftwaffe would be able to finally 
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have an advantage in the air. This operation was a success and the Germans believed the factory was 
damaged. The trap set by Double Cross paid off as the Germans, impressed with the ability to complete 
tough missions, promised Zigzag a special operation in America.152 The penetration of Zigzag into the 
Abwehr’s circle of trusted agents was made possible by structural oversight, and not Zigzag’s competence 
as an agent. 
 MI-5 also succeeded in using Zigzag to misinform the Germans about where their V-1 rockets 
were striking. It was a seemingly easier operation than the de Havilland factory but it was still important. 
In the closing months of 1944, 660 V-1 rockets had struck London and the Germans wanted to continue 
the onslaught.153 The Germans lacked sufficient information and the Twenty Committee viewed this as an 
opportunity to misinform the Abwehr. Over the course of a month, Zigzag lied to the Germans about the 
rockets’ placement and effectiveness. The Twenty Committee provided Zigzag with fake weather reports 
and photographs of the damage in London.154 With the Twenty Committee feeding the information to the 
Abwehr through Zigzag, the Germans never corrected their aim and continually struck in the suburbs and 
the south of London. It was only possible to sustain the deception because of the carefully coordinated 
planned that was promulgated from the interconnected structure of the Twenty Committee. 
 Without the constant control exerted by the Double Cross system and the Twenty Committee, 
these spies would have not have been as effective and would have easily compromised the whole system. 
The way the system was structured proved to be the only protection against the entire system becoming 
compromised. In addition to the rigid and hierarchical structure of Double Cross, the German failures also 
predisposed MI-5 to success. The agents, especially in the case of Tate, were pieces that could be easily 
copied and replaced. The real value stemmed from the compartmentalized system and its organization.  
And so, MI-5 succeeded. But the ultimate victory and the final grand gesture of deception still awaited.   
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“Let your plans be as dark and impenetrable as the night, and when you move, fall like a 
thunderbolt. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will 
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Operation Fortitude was the culminating deception by the Allied forces. Double Cross 
employed its agents in a smaller operation, Operation Bodyguard, which used multiple double 
agents collectively to deceive Hitler and his armies. The most famous of the agents was Juan 
Garcia, codenamed Garbo, with his extensive network of spies.  Garbo was a brilliant spy but 
like every other agent, the Double Cross structure he operated in was the catalyst for success. 
Without Double Cross’ contribution to the allied cause in Operation Fortitude, the allied landing 
forces would have encountered more resistance during the Normandy landings.157 
Operation Bodyguard encompassed the current agents being run in European deceptions 
but also the future regional deceptions brought about by specific units operating in Europe. 
Operation Bodyguard was a facet of the larger deception operation, Operation Fortitude, which 
itself was divided into two parts, Fortitude North and South. Fortitude North was a planned 
invasion of Norway, which was aimed to make the Germans suspect a heavy invasion of forces 
in Northern Europe away from France. The allies were to open up a supply line through Norway 
into Sweden to supply a full-scale march toward Germany. Fortitude South was to take place 
forty-five days before the actual D-Day and was designed to attack Pas de Calais, capture 
Antwerp, and support the push from Scandinavia planned in Fortitude North. The goals were to 
reduce the rate and weight of reinforcements of the target area, induce Hitler to expend all effort 
on fortifications in areas other than the Normandy, divert attention away from France and the 
Neptune forces, and force the Wehrmacht away from the Neptune landing zone before, during, 
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and after the invasion.158 The largest problem the Allies had was to prevent the plans from being 
leaked to Hitler and his forces. 
To accomplish a large-scale deception, the Double Cross agents were tasked with 
spreading misinformation. B1a division had Agents Brutus, Tricycle, Garbo, Tate, Mutt and Jeff, 
Gelatine, Bronx, and Treasure available to report misinformation to Germany about the Allies 
invasion plans. Of these nine agents, seven had wireless transmitting capabilities. MI-5 centered 
their resources on Garbo and his network of fictional agents. With such an extensive case, the 
Twenty Committee believed Garbo provided the best chance at deception. 
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Juan Pujol Garcia 
MI-5 Codename: Garbo 
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Figure 14 160 
Juan Pujol Garcia was the son of a wealthy industrialist who received a Catholic 
education in Spain until he was fifteen. Garcia then ventured into the manufacturing business 
with his brother after the death of his father. Another turn of events left Garcia forced to enlist in 
the Republican Army after the Spanish Civil War erupted. The Civil War was an important 
political influence on Garcia. The heavy communist influence pushed Garcia into a more 
conservative lifestyle. Garcia opposed the Republican Army because it committed atrocities 
against his fellow Spaniards and disregarded the Spanish constitution. Garcia’s dislike for the 
Army led him to go into hiding, avoiding routine searches for nearly two years until he was 
arrested and held for nineteen days before making a daring escape. Garcia then obtained a new 
identity and re-enlisted in the Republican Army with the plan to defect to Franco’s forces once 
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on the front line. Garcia was trained in a communications company and then defected to Franco’s 
forces as soon as his company reported to the front line. He endured hours of interrogation over 
the course of a few months in Franco’s detention facility before being enlisted into Franco’s 
forces.  
Garcia came to the realization that the radical right was just as intolerable as the radical 
left, and thus departed Spain for good. Garcia tried to convince the British he would be useful as 
a spy but he was rejected at the embassy in Madrid. At this juncture, he was determined to prove 
to the British that the Germans would have use for him in their intelligence division. After many 
attempts, the Germans finally accepted him and sent him to England to gather as much 
intelligence as possible and recruit sub-agents. Garcia then disclosed to the British his status as a 
German agent and willingly offered to work for them. The British gladly accepted; agent Garbo 
was born.161  
Without the Enigma machine to check German reactions to Garbo’s information, the 
Garbo case would have been deemed dangerous to handle and the British would not have 
exploited it to the extent that they did.162 With certainty from Enigma intercepts and a strong 
foundation of trust built up with Garbo, MI-5 began his carefully constructed exploitation of the 
Abwehr. B1a division had four goals with respect to Garbo: the notional organization of his life 
in England, gaining intelligence through Garbo’s transmissions, misinforming the Germans 
through Garbo’s transmissions, and serving as the mechanism to initiate deception plans.163  
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The first objective for Garbo was to find out in which areas of England the Germans were 
interested. MI-5 offered the Germans, through Garbo, specific areas of England where they 
should send any sub-agents. The first response from Germany was to send them to the Newcastle 
area.164 Over the next couple of years Garbo continually built his network, under the watchful 
eye of Double Cross, with small-scale tactics such as the one mentioned above. The result was a 
vast system of sub-agents and personnel from whom Garbo would acquire his information. 
Garbo was brilliant in his preparations and cultivations of sources but it was the oversight by MI-
5, which carefully tracked his case’s progress, which allowed Garbo to succeed.  
The Garbo network was an immense task to cultivate, let alone run. Small details that 
could potentially warn the Germans of Garbo’s treachery had to be debated over and over until 
Garbo possessed authorized information that he could give to the Germans. For example, the 
courier system Garbo used to send information was carefully tracked. The fictional system the 
Abwehr believed he used, which in reality was controlled by MI-5, had to plan the drop and pick 
up dates of letters carefully for Garbo to avoid tipping of the Germans. The problem using MI-
5’s system was that the fictional courier could never be in two places at once. The date a letter 
was mailed to Lisbon meant that Garbo’s courier was there as well. For example, “if the courier 
established himself as having been in Lisbon on the 20th of the month, and the Germans from 
their records knew that they had delivered money for Garbo at the courier’s Lisbon address, on 
the 19th of the month, it was inevitable that he should have collected the incoming letter.”165 
Reconciling these problems with coordination from all units within the B division and the 
Twenty Committee is the reason why agents had so much success. Because of the 
compartmentalization, information was streamed together with fluidity, thus preventing small 
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mistakes from giving away a double agent’s intentions. The courier problem was a small facet of 
a large network, proving that the system set the agents up for success.  
Operation Fortitude stands as an important part of Double Cross’ success. Garbo, his 
network, and the other agents that Double Cross used to complete its large-scale deception did so 
in Operation Bodyguard, and by extension Operation Fortitude. The focal point for the fake 
invasion would take place in Pas de Calais. The subset plan in Bodyguard and Fortitude that 
involved Pas de Calais was named Quicksilver. The Quicksilver Plan relied on agents like 
Garbo, in addition to other deception forces, to feed important information to the Germans 
through the Abwehr. Quicksilver was then broken into six parts and labeled 1-6.166 Quicksilver 1 
dealt with informing that two Army groups, Twenty-first Army Group and the First United 
States Army Group (FUSAG), were at the disposal of the Allied command. After D-Day FUSAG 
was tasked with striking the Pas de Calais and the Twenty-first group was to stretch German 
reinforcements down toward Normandy. Quicksilver 2 encompassed the wireless deception of 
the Germans. Quicksilver 3 involved placing dummy landing craft to satisfy German aerial 
reconnaissance. Quicksilver 4 made Allied air campaigns focus evenly between the actual 
landing area in Normandy and the fictional landing areas in Operation Fortitude. Quicksilver 5 
increased activity in Dover to make the Germans believe that wireless stations were to be 
erected. Quicksilver 6 installed decoy night-lights to simulate hard targets for German bombers 
and reconnaissance plans. These areas were passed through agents like Garbo and supplemented 
by the work of the Allied deception staffs. Quicksilver was another instance where structure and 
communication formulated the deception that was merely transmitted by the agents.  
With Operation Fortitude approaching Garbo was ordered to report on operations being 
carried out in Wales. Garbo sent information received from his sub-agents on troop build-ups 
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and reported that it looked as if the regiments stationed there were gearing for an assault. MI-5 
then moved troops to support Garbo’s claims and began stepping up bombing raids on Calais. 
Garbo continually satisfied German demands and MI-5 realized his potential. Garbo was given 
an office around the corner from MI-5 with a hard line into MI-5. As a final gesture of trust, 
Garbo was let in on the finalized plans for Operation Fortitude to ensure that he could accurately 
deceive his Abwehr handlers. Garbo routinely sent messages stating the invasion would take 
place in Pas de Calais. For instance, he wrote that “after personal consultation with my agents . . 
. I am of the opinion, in view of the strong troop concentrations in S.E. and E. England which are 
not taking part in the present operations, that these operations are diversionary maneuvers 
designed to draw off enemy reserves in order to make a decisive attack in another place . . . it 
may take place in the Pas de Calais area.”167 
Even after the D-day invasions, the Germans kept forces around, on Garbo’s word, to 
defend Calais. The Abwehr had so much faith in Garbo, even after it was clear no one would 
invade Calais, that they sent this message between Abwehr officials: “The report is credible. The 
reports received last week from Arabel (Garbo) undertaking have been confirmed without 
exception and are to be described as especially valuable. The main line of investigation in future 
is to be the enemy group of forces southeastern and eastern England. It would also be especially 
valuable to learn in good time when the formations which are at present assembled in Western 
Scottish ports put to sea and what their destination is.”168 The trust is testament to the brilliance 
of the operation and its structural foundations.  Because of the Double Cross system, the men 
who waded ashore on D-day encountered less German resistance because of the information men 
like Garbo sent to the Germans.  
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CONCLUSION 
 The Double Cross system was an unprecedented espionage operation that achieved a 
success never before seen in the world of covert operations. It lied to Hitler and controlled 
German espionage within Britain. Many have argued that Double Cross’ success comes from the 
human aspects of the system. Whether it was the agents themselves, like the brilliant Garbo, the 
devoted handlers, or the ingenious men who controlled the information that passed through the 
system, like Masterman, Liddell, White, or Robertson, the people involved in Double Cross were 
invaluable. Without them, Double Cross would never have made it out of the conceptual stage. 
But I believe there is more to the story than just the people. Double Cross succeeded because of 
external reasons that allowed the members of Double Cross to reach new heights in the arena of 
espionage and counterespionage.  
 Double Cross relied on a multitude of factors. The foundations that Double Cross laid 
upon from 1939-1945 were an important part of its success. From World War I through the 
interwar period, MI-5 went through growing stages where it took its lessons learned in espionage 
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from 1914-1917 and applied it to the needs of an ever-changing intelligence system in World 
War II. With its prewar foundation MI-5 undertook its first agent, Agent Snow, and conducted 
what is classified as the first phase of the Double Cross system. Then, without the code breakers 
at Bletchley Park it is arguable whether or not MI-5 would have been successful at neutralizing 
enemy agents at all. The breakthroughs in Enigma count for the largest success of Double Cross. 
 MI-5 needed an enemy in order to exercise the power of Double Cross. In the early years 
of the war, it was clear that total war had revitalized intelligence agencies’ roles in warfare. More 
importantly, without the failures of the Abwehr and its leader, Admiral Canaris’ undermining of 
Nazism, Double Cross would have had to face an invested and worthy adversary. Because the 
Abwehr was not united with their Nazi leaders, Double Cross had a much easier time exploiting 
the German intelligence apparatus.  
 The structure and formation of MI-5 was the final key to Double Cross system. The 
founders of Double Cross slowly realized, through its continued use, that the 
compartmentalization of the system was critical. The Twenty Committee authorized all 
information, making it easy for MI-5 to keep track of all the aspects of the agents’ cases. Equally 
important to the structure was the initial start each agent had within Double Cross system. 
Without the expertise in turning agents from Colonel Stephens, the agents of Double Cross 
would have not started their careers so successfully. All of the agents operated well because of 
the system. They had resources, were well taken care of, and had the support of their case 
officers. There are many things that made Double Cross successful. The men and women 
associated with the system were a part. More importantly, the foundations, the enemy, and 
structure of Double Cross led the allies to success in the war of deception for the free world. 
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 The legacies left by the Double Cross system are of equal importance. There is a practical 
and ethical legacy to consider. Practically, the Double Cross system was a near perfect tool that 
succeeded in a time where intelligence was just becoming important. Because of its success, the 
system became a blueprint that many countries followed through the Cold War. Handling spies 
and misinformation now became easier with the blueprint that MI-5 provided in the war. All that 
needed changing was the enemy. With the end of World War II, for instance, America copied the 
system and exchanged Communism for Nazism as the enemy. What no one cared to consider 
was that the Double Cross system worked so well because of the conditions that it operated in. 
The entire world was at war against a clear enemy that wore uniforms. The system worked 
because MI-5 could make decisions, no matter how unethical, because the extinction of the state 
was at risk. Even ethical conduct in war is disregarded in favor of national survival. The postwar 
era in which the Americans picked up the torch from the British lacked the conditions that World 
War II provided. Most importantly, in World War II there was a clear enemy. Americans, 
although, believed that there was far more on the line in the Cold War than in World War Two 
but lacked a tangible enemy. An opponent who maliciously employed armies, naval, and 
airpower was swapped for an enemy that had military power but did not employ it. Reactionary 
warfare was replaced by the possibility of preemptive warfare. 
The ethical side of Double Cross’ legacy is embroiled in America’s cold war 
counterespionage policies. The Cold War, as history illustrates, was fought in proxy wars against 
people who did not wear uniforms and did not abide by just conduct in war. Just as spy mania 
gripped England preceding the war, America believed communist spies infiltrated its intelligence 
services and country. The Double Cross system shaped more than just the structure of 
intelligence agencies and agendas in the postwar era; it shaped culture as well.  The success of 
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Double Cross in wartime was used to justify ethics in peacetime and the culture of an entire 
nation. The importance of the Double Cross system and this thesis is not just in showing who is 
to credit for the success of MI-5 in World War II. By explaining the system and its success, it 
also implies a legacy that was used to build, shape, and run the most powerful intelligence 
agencies from the end of the World War II to today. The importance of intelligence was built on 
the back of the Double Cross system and its personnel. More importantly, a precedent of trading 
ethical conduct for national security was set. That precedent is still very visible in the 
intelligence services of the modern day.  
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